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要　　　旨
本論は，経済学及び社会学における最も重要な制度理論，即ちヴェブレンの有閑階級理論，アダム・
スミスの道徳情操論，ブルデューのハビタス理論，パーソンズの社会システム理論を詳細に検討し，そ
れらの理論が，⑴個人の動機構造における社会的文化的共通規範価値の内部化或いは制度化と，⑵社
会的文化的価値規範と個人の選好或いは欲求傾向との相互関係の進化の説明原理を，何処に求めてい
るのかを明確にし，経済学が強調する主意的個人主義の合理性と社会学が論じる社会的裁定下での共
通規範価値志向の両者を保持する中間領域が存在することを，財の社会的価値を特定化する一つの有
効な理論を提供することによって示すものである．これらの制度化理論は，帰結として，個人の選択
は社会的表現の一環であり，この表現における合理性は何らかの形でライフスタイルと階級上昇志向
によって特徴づけられる社会的空間に根ざしたものであるとする見解を共有する．本論は，財に見出さ
れる社会的価値は，階級上昇志向・階級下降回避志向を表わす実質的反応関数と階級毎の財の評判を
示す指数の合成によって決まるとする理論を提供する．また，本論は，このような社会的規範に基づ
く内生的選好形成を限定合理性・限定認知力に関係づけ，階級上昇志向を軸とする経済社会的ゲーム
における戦略的補完性，均衡の多元性，乗数効果を論じ，社会が規範として認める階級上昇志向・階
級下降回避志向に基づく内生的選好・気質の形成は社会の発展的進化の源泉であることを論じる．
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. . . the human good turns out to be activity of 
the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there 
are several virtues, in accordance with the best 
and most complete.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I. 7.
1.  Introduction
Whether human action is instrumentally rational 
or institutionally disposed splits the human 
ontology into two poles that have not yet been 
fully integrated.  Economists of the mainstream 
hold on to the premise that preferences must 
be at the foundation of human action before this 
action can be analyzed in rational terms, paying 
little more than lip service to a deeper question 
as to how such preferences are formed in a social 
and cultural environment in which human beings 
interact and orient themselves to the facts of social 
norms.  This premise was reinforced by Stigler and 
Becker’s analysis: De gustibus non est disputandum. 
They insisted that when human behavior appears 
to contradict the assumption of stable preferences, 
we need to take a closer look at such behavior from 
the standpoint of hidden structures that define 
the constraints themselves, showing that if such 
constraints are correctly identified, the optimization 
under the assumption of stable preferences 
(measured in utility terms) can still explain a 
variety of behavior that would otherwise remain 
inexplicable in the conventional choice theory 
[Stigler and Becker (1977)].2） By an ingenious 
way Stigler and Becker showed that there is a way 
to avoid the issue of variable preferences if one 
turns to the objective structures of technological 
relations under which a consumer serves as a 
factory that transforms the goods purchased in 
the market to the commodities yielding direct 
utility. They contended that when there appears to 
be a discrepancy between stable preferences and 
actual behavior, we should look for the missing 
links in commodity-production technologies 
rather than taking an easy route of resorting to 
the variability of preferences.  Sociologists, on 
the other hand, with many divergent thoughts on 
the issue of preference formation, are concerned 
with the social origin of values/preferences or 
institutionalized need-dispositions, as well as with 
the emergence of social relations that constitute a 
social structure.  Human action is viewed typically 
as a social action system (or as an expression of 
a socialized psyche) characterized by a certain 
set of requirements, whose cohesiveness hinges 
on functions, social norms, and culture.  While 
human action is viewed as voluntarily constituted, 
sociologists hold a general view that a social 
system is both upwardly and downwardly caused 
through institutionalization, without which society 
would lack an internal mechanism of sustaining 
itself as a system.  In broad terms, neoclassical 
economists are interested in building (what they 
claim to be) value-free theories of human behavior, 
without delving into the question of whether such 
theories can make sense without the social nature 
of human beings or the moral character of decision 
makers.  They tend to view the emergence of 
stable social instutitions or social norms more as a 
consequence of voluntary exchanges among free 
agents whose preferences cannot be accounted 
for a priori except for a minimum set of axioms 
that are only needed to ensure that behavior be 
consistent, rather than as an outcome of a social 
dynamic process, which is driven by social-
psychological motivations but at the same time 
regulated by social control mechanisms that keep 
human behavior within certain socially acceptable 
bounds.3）   
Of course, this is an overly simplistic characteri-
zation of the approaches taken by economists 
and sociologists in capturing human action. The 
difference that separates them is essentially more 
hypothetical than fundamental in nature.  This 
can be illustrated by considering the nature of 
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utility function that provides the starting point for 
economists.  Whether a posited utility function is 
problematic or not depends crucially on the space 
on which it is defined as well as on the nature of 
questions that are addressed. If it is defined on 
the space of physical goods (or commodities) 
as in economics, it will never meet the approval 
of sociologists because social goods or social 
relations, or, more generally, social parameters, 
are excluded.  But, if the utility function is defined 
on the space of human activities which are social 
in nature, it becomes an important conceptual 
apparatus that incorporates the fact that men’s 
activities in society are connected directly or 
indirectly.  Furthermore, to the extent that human 
activities are moral in nature, the specification of a 
utility function remains incomplete until the moral 
characteristics of human activities are taken into 
account.  This shows that it is not the concept of 
utility function per se that is problematic; rather it 
is the objects (along with their moral nature) on 
which a utility function is defined that really matter. 
It is almost always the case that the objects of 
choice that are analyzed cannot be separated from 
the questions asked by economists or sociologists. 
This confusion of the analytic expediency with 
the metaphysics of  utility function should receive 
some attention when we criticize either of the 
two approaches from its opposite standpoint.4） If 
one purports to analyze a problem (economic or 
sociological) rather than describing it, the concept 
of utility function, if carefully specified, remains as 
one of the most powerful tools in our tool box.  The 
fundamental problem with relying on the concept 
of utility function in analyzing human actions that 
are embedded in social situations, however, is 
that a utility function, by it’s a priori nature, is not 
grounded in such situtions, hence cannot reflect 
them.  We will take up this issue when we later 
show that the social (or symbolic) value of a good 
can be measured by convolving an emulation-
avoidance pattern with its popularity indices 
across reference groups. But, if the social value is 
measured by such convolving, this measurement 
gives rise to a socially-induced ordering on the 
goods space.  Social choice based on this social 
ordering is analogous to economic choice based on 
preference ordering given a priori.  The difference 
is that the first is based on social norms or facts 
of social situations, hence grounded in society 
whereas the second is completely independent 
of such norms.  But, social choice based on this 
ordering is just as instrumental and rational 
as economic choice is as far as the principle of 
choosing the most socially valued object from the 
feasibility set is concerned (Hayakawa, 2000).  This 
analogy shows that the rational instrumentality 
cannot be a conceptual divide separating economic 
ontology from social ontology.  
At any rate, while the basic orientations of 
economists and sociologists differ, there has been 
an exploding interdisciplinar y communication 
between the two groups in recent years (see, 
e.g., numerous publications in The Journal of 
Socioeconomics and Rational Choice; Coleman, 
1990 ;  Bar on  and  Hannan ,  1994 ;  Sme lser 
and Swedberg, 1994; Bowles, 1998; Smelser 
and Swedberg, 2005). This interdisciplinar y 
development is accelerated by an increasing 
awareness on both camps that human beings, 
whether in isolation or in collectivity, face the 
irremovable fact that the resources with which to 
achieve their ends are constrained and that human 
beings, behaving under a complex set of social 
relations, not only acquire certain expectations 
concerning the behavior of other individuals, but 
also are conscious of the existence of social and 
cultural norms. Both disciplines are amenable 
to the fact that individuals cannot exist unless 
embedded in social relations/situations and that 
choice decisions they exercise, for this reason, 
cannot be independent of social/cultural norms or 
moral values.  It is, therefore, less disputed than 
before that the latter influences the formation of the 
pro-social need-dispositions of individuals, without 
which social institutions cannot be institutued 
to begin with, much less to be sustained.  Thus, 
with such awareness, the question of how moral 
4agents exercise their rational choices in a social 
system has come to capture the interest of the two 
sciences.  In this connection, it may be pointed out 
that Bernard Hodgson (2001, p. 310), after having 
examined the issue of whether economics is a 
moral science, concludes that “in the final analysis, 
rational economic man is only an atrophied image 
of man in reality.”
A number of new perspectives, some developed 
independently and others in conjunction, have 
aided this development.   Those who work 
with psychological state/elements in human 
behavior have cultivated the field now known 
as behavioral economics, helping economists to 
turn their attention to such notions as reference 
dependent preferences, endowments ef fects, 
and hyperdiscounting, that account for those 
aspects of behavior not easily reconcilable with 
the conventional economic theor y [see, e.g., 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1990, 1991); Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991); Rabin and Thaler (2001); 
Koszegi and Rabin (2004); Laibson (1996, 1997); 
and Ainslie (1991)].  The notions of reference 
dependent preferences and endowments effects, 
if extended to behavior in social contexts, suggest 
that man’s socially acquired preferences for 
risk-taking in emulation as well as for the social 
serviceability of goods should reflect not only what 
individuals possess as their economic and social 
endowments but also where individuals are located 
in the social space.  Moreover, to the extent that 
decisions under uncertainty and intertemporal 
decisions have a formal similarity, it would not 
be surprising if the notion of hyperdiscounting 
applies to social emulation under uncer tainty 
and creates a strong bias toward man’s current 
social status.  Experimental and game theoretical 
economists have worked on the economics 
of prosocial orientation including fair ness, 
reciprocity, and altruism, suggesting that man’s 
preferences or dispositions are not simply self-
centered but anchored in social norms of fairness 
and other-regarding [see Fehr and Gächter 
(2000) for a review of the literature].  On top of 
these developments, there has been a remarkable 
development known as rational choice theory [e.g., 
Homans 1961; Blau 1964; Coleman 1973]; this 
theory, within the framework of methodological 
individualism, has flourished as a powerful way 
of explaining complex social phenomena in terms 
of rational actions of individuals and in terms of 
voluntar y exchanges among approval-seeking 
individuals.  The development of this theor y 
ironically has brought with it a serious need to 
reconcile rational individual actions on the one 
hand and social value norms on the other.  That 
is, we cannot avoid the question of how such 
norms are internalized into individual preferences 
if they are to be made compatible with individual 
preferences.  All these new developments may be 
taken, as Thaler (2000) describes, as an attempt 
to bring down homo economicus to the level of a 
more earthly homo sapiens by focusing on how 
in fact human beings behave as social animals 
constrained by bounded capabilities.  Of course, 
how to characterize the behavior of homo sapiens 
is no less problematic than how to characterize the 
behavior of homo economicus.
These developments have shed new light on 
the two-way relationship between individual 
preferences and social norms, but how individuals 
internalize social norms into their preferences has 
remained largely an open question.  Often we hear 
that individuals are motivated by their self-interest, 
and that this interest is not necessarily in harmony 
with, if not contradictory to, social interest.  But 
the notion of self makes sense only if it is paired 
with the notion of society, for the obvious reason 
that the self of a person does not develop unless 
it is embedded in society.  A fortiori, self-interest 
does not make much sense if it is treated as an 
integrated whole of inclinations that is independent 
of social relations and norms.  So any statement 
to alarm that self-interest necessarily contradicts 
social order is itself problematic because by so 
saying it assumes that self-interest is an autonomous 
motivational force that disregards the interest 
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of others.5） While human physiological needs 
originate in the physiology of the body, human 
social needs originate in the thinking of the mind; 
the latter is no less real than the former.  If human 
behavior is embedded in society, this question 
of internalization of social norms in individual 
preferences, or, of blending of physiological needs 
and social dispositions in the formation of social 
self, cannot be bypassed.  If the self of a person 
owes its origin to society, man’s preferences (in 
economists’ terms) or man’s need-dispositions 
(in sociologists’ terms) must have their origin in 
social relations and social norms; at the same time, 
if society is characterized by self-sustaining value 
norms that keep it from falling apart, such norms 
must be reinforced by decisions made voluntarily 
by individuals.  How can we then account for 
such a norm-conscious (or culture-conscious) 
behavior of individuals, which is necessary for 
the continuation of society as an integrated and 
cohesive whole?  It is this question that motivates 
our inquiry in this paper.
From the standpoint of individuals making 
actual choices, what matters is how human beings 
assess and, in the end, rank choice objects no 
matter how complicated and difficult this process 
of assessment might be.  As long as human beings 
are social beings, this ordering, being inclusive 
of both physiological and social needs of diverse 
kinds, must be a mixed relation, a net outcome 
of so many non-commensurable elements taken 
into account simultaneously side by side. It should 
incorporate physiological needs and desires, 
acquired or innate, as well as moral/ethical 
values, social sanctions, social responsibilities, 
friendship, legal rules, customs, and many other 
factors that cannot be reduced to the common 
denominator of utility.  From the choice-theoretic 
standpoint we are, therefore, forced to ask in 
the final analysis: How would individual agents 
determine their ordering of choice objects if 
social and cultural value norms (e.g., social norms 
that sanction emulative efforts for higher status 
identification), social control mechanisms (such 
as positive sanctions for conformity and negative 
sanctions against deviant behavior), and the 
duty to respect the general rules of morality are 
internalized into their motivational structure, and 
what would be a socioeconomic rationale for this 
determination? If economists’ and sociologists’ 
views are to complement each other in explaining 
socially embedded human action, there must be 
a reasonable accounting of the process of this 
endogenous preference/disposition formation in 
the mind of a human being.  This question needs 
to be addressed, at least, at two different levels, 
one at the level of examining various theories of 
internalization of social norms/values into the 
disposition of individuals in order to capture the 
constitutive elements that run through them, 
and the other at the level of building models of 
endogenous preference formation that are based 
on these elements.
For this reason, the present study is pursued 
in two steps. The first step is to examine carefully 
four major theories of institutionalization in 
economics and sociology: (1) Parsons’ theor y 
of social systems, (2) Veblen’s theor y of the 
leisure class, (3) Adam Smith’s theory of moral 
sentiments, and (4) Bourdeau’s theory of practice 
and distinction. These theories contain important 
observations on social actions/practices as well as 
on internalization of social norms into the need-
disposition of the individual.  The second step is 
to construct a theory that models the process of 
this internalization that brings about an effective 
ordering of choice objects that is firmly grounded 
in society, and then to examine the precise nature 
of this ordering and its implications for social 
behavior.  In doing so, we bring in, on top of the 
main elements of the four theories, such notions 
as the bounded rationality, reference group taking, 
and the strategic complementarity in the behavior 
of socially interacting individuals.  Although this 
second step is only outlined here, it suggests 
that there is yet a rich middle ground between 
economics and sociology, in which human behavior 
can be analyzed as a socially rational behavior 
6that transcends the question of whether this 
behavior is completely voluntaristic or completely 
deterministic.
2.   Parsons’ notion of human action in a 
social system 
To account for human action in a social system 
systematically, it is still useful to star t with 
the basic framework of Parsons’ theor y of 
social systems ar ticulated in the opening par t 
of The Social System (1951) (hereafter, SS), 
which views society as a structure of roles and 
statuses that integrate functionally relations of 
interactions among individual agents. While his 
functionalism-structuralism has been criticized 
from more dynamic, micro-oriented perspectives 
(e.g., from the standpoints of the theories of 
symbol ic  interact ionism, phenomenology, 
ethnomethodology, rational choice and exchange), 
it still provides a unified way of organizing micro-
theories of individual actions-interactions and 
macro-theories of emergent properties [see, e.g., 
Alexander (1983)]. 
According to Talcott Parsons, social actions 
are, most fundamentally, interactions among 
individual actors.  Such actions constitute a system 
with three features.  (1) Actions are oriented 
to social, cultural, and physical objects in an 
environment or situations in which they take place. 
(2)  Actors’ motivations, which are organized and 
integrated on the personality level, have three 
orientations: cathectic (gratificational), cognitive, 
and evaluative. (3) Actions become structured with 
complementary expectations under stable symbolic 
systems of meanings called culture, without which 
it would not be possible to integrate action systems 
in which double contingency of actions of alter and 
ego is the critical feature of interactions (SS, pp. 
1–6).  Parsons writes: 
Reduced to the simplest possible terms, then, 
social system consists in a plurality of individual 
actors interacting with each other in a situation 
which has at least a physical or environmental 
aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a 
tendency to the ’optimization of gratification’ 
and whose relation to their situations, including 
each other, is defined and mediated in terms 
of a system of culturally structured and shared 
symbols.  (Parsons 1951, pp. 5–6)
Culture is a tradition of shared symbolic systems; 
it is comprised of three systems: belief systems, 
systems of expressive symbolism, and systems 
of evaluative standards.  The elements of the 
third system, ser ving as criteria or standards 
for selection among the alternatives that open in 
concrete situations, constitute a system of values. 
Parsons identifies orientation to this system, 
distinguished from motivational orientation, as 
the fundamental device of ar ticulating cultural 
traditions into the action system (SS, p. 12).
More specifically, a concrete action/interaction 
system of an individual actor is an integrated 
structure of motivational and cultural or symbolic 
elements.  Because interactions are embedded 
in situations of double-contingency, expectations 
as to alter’s actions play a crucial role in deciding 
ego’s actions.  Such expectations, by their 
complementarity, give rise to the need for order in 
two dimensions, namely, (1) order in the symbolic 
systems which make communication possible 
and (2) order in the mutuality of the motivational 
orientation to the normative aspect of expectations 
to avoid the “Hobbesian” disorder. The latter order 
necessitates orientation to common standards with 
positive sanctions to encourage conformity to them 
and negative sanctions to discourage deviation 
from them; it also necessitates integration of actors’ 
motivation with the normative cultural standards. 
On a range of possible modes to a value-standard 
in the motivational sense, Parsons distinguishes 
at the one pole the attitude of “expediency” where 
instrumental interests dictate whether or not to 
conform and at the other pole the “introjection“ 
or internalization of the standard to make the act 
of conformity a need-disposition of the actor’s 
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own personality structure.  It is this introjection 
of cultural values in the motivational structure 
of the actor’s personality that integrates actions-
interactions in a social system.  In Parsons’ view, 
when conformity to a value-orientation standard 
not only fulfills the actor’s own need-dispositions 
but also optimizes the reactions of other significant 
actors, the standard acquires the status of being 
institutionalized.  Thus, institutionalization of 
cultural value patterns, together with positive 
and negative sanctions, is a consequence of an 
internalization of such patterns in the motivational 
structure of individual actors of the society; it 
is not a spontaneous order that emerges from 
actions and interactions of agents motivated by 
instrumental interests to satisfy idiosyncratic 
tastes.  With such institutionalized common 
normative standards and sanctions, the conformity-
deviation dimension of an actor tends to coincide 
with the favorable-unfavorable or the gratification-
deprivation dimension. Individual actors with 
such institutionalized normative values then 
participate in a net-work of patterned interactive 
relations between actors, which is positionally and 
procedually integrated with statuses and roles, 
respectively (SS, pp. 36–39).
Internalization of common normative values 
is mediated by the sentiments or value-attitudes 
that are learned and acquired socially.  Such 
sentiments then become the need-dispositions of 
the personality.  By internalizing institutionalized 
values and developing the sentiments for them, “the 
‘deeper’ layers of motivation become harnessed 
to the fulfillment of role-expectations” (SS, p. 
42).  Moreover, once common cultural values are 
internalized in the motivation structure of the 
personality in the form of the need-dispositions, 
conformity to such values of role-expectations 
acquire the character of the ‘ego-ideal’ in the 
sense it is what one wants to achieve as well as the 
character of the superego in the sense it is moral 
to meet the responsibilities that the conformity 
implies. It also gives actors the sense of self-
respect, adequacy, or security in the psychological 
sense (SS, p. 40).
Then, Parsons states the fundamental dynamic 
theorem of sociology, calling for sociological 
theory in the sciences of action.  He defines the 
nature of this theory and this dynamic theorem as 
follows:
This integration of a set of common value 
patterns with the internalized need-disposition 
structure of the constituent personalities is the 
core phenomenon of the dynamics of social 
systems. That the stability of any social system 
except the most evanescent interaction process 
is dependent on a degree of such integration 
may be said to be the fundamental dynamic 
theorem of sociology.  It is the major point of 
reference for all analysis which may claim to be 
a dynamic analysis of social process. 
It is the significance of institutional integration 
in this sense which lies at the basis of the place 
of specifically sociological theory in the sciences 
of action and the reasons why economic 
theor y and other versions of the conceptual 
schemes which give predominance to rational 
instrumental goal-orientation cannot provide an 
adequate model for the dynamic analysis of the 
social system in general terms.  . . . (SS, p. 42)
The theory of institutional behavior, which is 
essentially sociological theory, is precisely of the 
highest significance in social science because 
by setting the problems of social dynamics in a 
context of institutional structure and drawing 
the implications of the theorem of institutional 
integration which has just been stated, this 
theor y is enabled to exploit and extend the 
knowledge of modern psychology about the 
non- and irrational aspects of motivation in order 
to analyze social processes.  It follows also that 
any conceptual scheme which utilizes only the 
motivational elements of rational instrumental 
goal-orientation can be an adequate theory only 
of certain relatively specialized processes within 
the framework of an institutionally structured 
8social system. (SS, p. 43)
Thus, Parsons’ view of society and individual 
actions is one of integration, between norms 
(common value patterns) on the one hand and 
the internalized need-dispositions of individuals 
on the other.  Because social and cultural values 
are introjected into the personality of actors as 
need-dispositions, the conformity-deviation tends 
to coincide with the gratification-deprivation, 
thereby making it possible for both society and 
individual actions to be integrated.  That is, social 
and cultural values are reflected in the mirror 
image of need-dispositions of individuals with 
the conformity-deviation constantly correcting 
this image through gratification-deprivation.  He 
cautions against reducing motivational dynamics 
to rational instrumental terms, for this reduction 
leads to Hobbesian thesis, which, to Parsons, is a 
reduction ad absurdum of the concept of a social 
system (SS 43).  Parsons makes it clear that for 
institutionalized action there is no dichotomy 
between preferences/values of individuals and the 
social system in which their actions take place. 
Thus, this intimacy between social and cultural 
values and need-dispositions (or preferences/
values) of individuals marks, for Parsons, a 
complete depar ture from economics whose 
fundamental methodology is founded on rational 
instrumental goal-orientation.
We next turn to Parsons’ use of Freud’s notion of 
superego as an integrating factor in the motivation 
at the personality level, followed by Wrong’s (1961) 
and Kaye’s (1991) criticisms against an over-
socialized view of man and the use of Freudian 
superego as an integrating factor.
3.   Motivation on the personality level— 
Parsons’ extension of Freud’s notion of 
superego
Parsons holds that action systems of individual 
actors are integrated around three integrative foci: 
(1) the individual actor, (2) the interactive system, 
and (3) a system of cultural patterning.  Integration 
around the individual actor proceeds at the level of 
the personality or, equivalently, at the motivational 
structure of the actor.  In order for this integration 
to take place successfully, the personality structure 
(or the psychoanalytic structure of the personality) 
and the social system have to be integrated 
somehow. Since how the actor’s motivations are 
generated and structured to form the personality 
is a central focus of psychoanalysis, and since how 
behaviors of individual actors become patterned, 
through interaction, to form a social system is 
a primar y concern of sociology, integration of 
action systems at the level of individual actors 
implies that there has to be convergence of the two 
approaches around a unifying conceptual scheme 
that binds the personality structure with the social 
system. That is, it implies that there has to be a 
mechanism through which a commonly shared 
system of symbols called culture can be taken into 
the personality structure of the actor.  
On this convergence of psychoanalysis of the 
personality and sociological analysis of the social 
system, Parsons develops a unified theory of his 
own in his article, “The Superego and the Theory 
of Social Systems” published in Psychiatry 1952. His 
theorizing is based on his critique on the limitation 
of Freud’s notion of superego and Durkheim’s 
insight on the internalization of moral values.  
Superego is that function in the actor’s ego 
which is assigned the duties of self-observation, 
conscience, and the maintenance of ideals.6） 
Through a process of identification, the prohibitions 
that initially come from parents are introjected 
into the personality to take the place of the 
parental authority. Once the superego is formed, it 
observes, guides, and threatens the ego through 
moral restrictions and the impulse towards 
per fection.  What is crucially important about 
superego is the fact that the superego of children 
is built on that of their parents, hence it serves as a 
vehicle to transmit, from one generation to another, 
age-old values that have much bearing on man’s 
social behavior [see Hollitscher (1947), pp. 72–76].
Freud’s superego is a psychological instrument 
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by which moral values of society are introjected 
into the personality structure.  It provides a 
mechanism by which the regulative or the moral 
aspect of a common culture is transmitted to 
the personality structure so that it contributes 
to the maintenance of the stability of a social 
system under a generalized system of symbols. 
But, it is limited in that it does not take account 
other important aspects of culture that may be 
internalized in the ego.  In Durkheim’s view (1893), 
society is a symbolic system of moral norms that 
guide behavior of individual actors.  In such a 
system, moral norms function as the regulator of 
social behavior through creation of moral authority 
and moral values, so that society binds itself not 
by external coercion but by internalization of 
moral norms.  Thus, if internalized moral values 
are what sustains society over time, and if Freud’s 
superego is an instrumental mechanism by which 
moral norms or values are internalized into the 
personality structure of constituent members of 
society, society has in its hand a mechanism of self-
sustaining.  In this respect, Freud’s postulation of 
superego as a way of taking into the personality 
structure externally given moral values of society 
and Durkheim’s view of society as a coherent 
whole united by the presence of moral norms 
that are valued as such by individual actors are 
converging on one important insight that there is a 
personality-mediated mechanism that contributes 
crucially to the creation of society without external 
coercion.  On this convergence, Parsons writes:
 
. . . Freud’s discovery of the internalization of 
moral values as an essential part of the structure 
of the personality itself constituted such a crucial 
landmark in the development of the sciences of 
human behavior.  . . . [Parsons (1952), p. 18]
Parsons’ view is that because society is a system 
of interacting individuals with cognitive, cathectic, 
and evaluative orientations, and because culture is a 
system of generalized symbols and their meanings 
(containing the cognitive reference system, the 
system of expressive symbolism, and the system 
of moral standards) that mediate the cognitive, 
emotional, and evaluative components of this 
interaction, the superego, as the moral regulator 
of emotional reactions against actions of others, 
cannot be isolated from how society is organized 
in the three aspects; hence, Freud’s notion of the 
superego hints that internalization of the crucial 
characteristics of society into the personality 
structure takes place on a much wider scale, so 
that what is morally restraining is learned through 
social interaction guided by a cultural symbolism. 
In order for cultural symbolism to be internalized 
into the personal structure, the individual need to 
achieve an affective organization of a high order 
by building up emotional attachments to other 
persons and by developing the sensitivity to their 
attitudes through social interactions, and such 
an emotional organization is made possible only 
through acquisition of a cultural symbolism.7）
Thus, Parsons replaces Freud’s id-superego-
ego structure with a more integrated structure. 
Freud’s structure is based on the dichotomy of 
the external reality to which the person tries to 
adapt, with the id being the source of incessant 
impulses and instincts, with the superego being 
the moral and punitive regulator, and with the 
ego having many defense mechanisms; there, 
the superego is viewed to internalize the moral 
values of society into the personality structure. 
Parsons, on the other hand, holds that all three 
components of culture (the cognitive, cathectic, 
and evaluative components) are internalized into 
the ego structure of the individual actor. Freud’s 
impulse-repression model with ego-functions 
having defense mechanisms is replaced by Parsons 
with a model of a socialized actor whose values 
and need-dispositions are a result of socialization 
under a system of cultural symbols in all three 
dimensions: cognition, cathexis, and evaluation. 
Once the individual actor becomes socialized to 
such an extent, the personal structure and the 
cultural environment cannot be separated from 
each other.  The culture consists of (1) cognitive 
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reference system, (2) expressive-af fective sym-
bolism, and (3) common moral standards.  The 
symbolic elements of these are then internalized 
into the personality of the actor, whose ego 
has, internalized into it, (1) self-object images, 
(2) superego, and (3) symbolically organized 
affect.  Between individual actors, there are then 
(1) mutual cognitive orientation and evaluative 
appraisal, based on internalized self-object images, 
and (2) mutual cathexis and evaluative appraisal, 
based on symbolically organized affect.  With such 
internalization of culture, the invividual actor’s 
motivations/need-dispositions become integrated 
with it. This is Parson’s socialized conception of 
man and of the society-personality relationship 
expounded in Parsons (1952).  It is a conception 
of homo socius as institutionalized man, in which 
internalization of the symbolic elements of culture 
in the personality structure takes place on a wider 
scale than imagined by Freud.  
A word of caution on the socialization of man.  In 
his classical paper “The Oversocialized Conception 
of Man in Modern Sociology” (hereafter OS) 
published in American Sociological Review 
(1961), Wrong, in opposition to Parsons’ view of 
institutionalized man, raised a flag of caution on 
the oversocialized conception of man in sociology. 
Arguing that the goal of sociological theory is 
not to create a formal body of knowledge after 
the logical criteria of natural science, and being 
suspicious of the formalistic quest for universal 
propositions and all encompassing conceptual 
schemes, he insists on recalling the fundamental 
questions that theories are designed to answer 
as raison d’etre of social theory.  These questions 
include:  “How are men capable of uniting to form 
enduring societies in the first place?”; “Why and to 
what degree is change inherent in human societies 
and what are the sources of change?”; “How is 
man’s animal nature domesticated by society?” (OS, 
p. 183).
Focusing on the question, “How is it that man 
becomes tractable to social discipline?” (OS, p. 
184), Wrong expresses his concern that “much of 
current social theory offers an oversocialized view 
of man in addressing the Hobbesian question” of 
“how men are capable of the guidance by social 
norms and goals that makes possible an enduring 
society,” and “an over-integrated view of society 
in answering the Mar xist question” of “how 
complex societies manage to regulate and restrain 
destructive conflicts between groups” (OS , p. 184). 
According to Wrong, two theories are prevalent in 
answering the first question; (1) the first is based 
on the internalization of social norms as seen in 
Parsons’ theory of institutionalized action, and (2) 
the second is based on man’s desire to achieve 
a positive image of self or social status. But, 
Wrong cast these theories as unsound as eristical 
thinking.  More properly, it should be asked, in his 
words: “How is it that violence, conflict, revolution, 
and the individual’s sense of coercion by society 
manage to exist at all, if this view is correct?” (OS, 
p. 186).  To Wrong, Parsons’ view of social norms 
as constitutive of human nature and his attempt to 
integrate this view with Freud’s theory of superego 
hides the tension and the inner conflict between 
powerful impulses and superego controls that are 
crucially important in determining actual behavior; 
Parsons appropriated the concept of superego from 
a dynamic Freudian id-superego-ego structure. 
Likewise, the view that man is the acceptance-
seeker is only a partial view of man, too simple-
minded. Wrong reminds us: 
. . .  All  of the great nineteenth and early 
twentieth centur y sociologists saw it as one 
of their major tasks to expose the unreality of 
such abstractions as economic man, the gain-
seeker of the classical economists; political man, 
the power-seeker of the Machiavellian tradition 
in political science; self-preserving man, the 
security-seeker of Hobbes and Darwin; sexual or 
libidinal man, the pleasure-seeker of doctrinaire 
Freudianism; and even religious man, the God-
seeker of the theologians.  It would be ironical 
if it should turn out that they have merely 
contributed to the creation of yet another reified 
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abstraction in socialized man, the status-seeker 
of our contemporary sociologists. (OS, p. 190)
Rather than suggesting that we return to the 
older dualistic view of a human nature divided 
between a “social man” and a “natural man”, Wrong 
stresses the need for a more dialectical view of 
the human nature along a social-psychological 
Freudian view of man.  Socialization consists in 
the transmission of culture and in the process of 
becoming human, but men are not completely 
molded by social norms and cultural values.  Yet, 
men cannot exist without culture and outside 
of society (OS, p. 192).  “When our sociological 
theory over-stresses the stability and integration 
of society we will end up imagining that man is the 
disembodied, conscience-driven, status-seeking 
phantom of current theory.  We must do better if 
we really wish to win credit outside of our ranks 
for special understanding of man, that plausible 
creature whose wagging tongue so often hides the 
despair and darkness in his heart” (OS 193).
Thus, Wrong cautions that while excessive 
psychologism is not productive in sociology, we 
should work toward making assumptions about 
human nature explicit and that such assumptions 
should not be simple-minded, over-abstracted 
views of man; only by doing so can we avoid falling 
into the trap of over-socialized views of man and 
over-integrated views of society.
Another flag of caution was raised by Kaye 
(1991), who, in his paper “A False Convergence: 
Freud and the Hobbesian Problem of Order” 
published in Sociological Theory (1991) (hereafter 
FC) argues that placing Freud’s social theor y 
within the Hobbesian problem of order is a false 
convergence.  While this theory is understood/
interpreted as saying primarily that asocial human 
nature is transformed into a social one and that 
individual personality is integrated with the social 
order by internalizing social and cultural forces 
into the superego (or that psychology is integrated 
with sociology by the process of internalization), 
such an understanding obscures Freud’s theory 
based on “the notion of unconscious mental 
processes governed by fundamentally ambivalent 
desires and watched over by the defensive forces 
of ‘repression’ ” (FC, p. 89); “such a sociologized 
Freud is reduced to yet another observer of the 
struggles between nature and culture, passion and 
reason, individual and society, offers little of value” 
(FC, p. 89).  Examining Kalakowski’s critique 
of Freud, Kaye points out that Kalakowski fails 
“to see what Freud regards as the fundamental 
real i ty of  human ambivalence,  namely the 
simultaneous presence of conflicting desires in 
the human psyche—love and hate, aggression and 
submission, individuation and union, attraction 
and repulsion” and that Kalakowski “attributes 
to logical contradictions what Freud considers to 
be the contradictory aspects of our nature” (FC, 
p. 91).  The civilizing effects of love that makes 
the human nature both social and asocial; the 
feelings of hostility and fear from which are born 
a creative sense of guilt, fraternal feeling, religion, 
and morality; the immortal id which contains “the 
experiences and residues of countless historical 
egos, resurrected in the individual psyche in the 
formation of the superego”; the historical nature 
of instinct which is not separate from the human 
nature that includes cultural acquisitions and 
transformations; culture which is not simply anti-
instinctual (of external necessity of conformity) 
and is engaged in both the compensation and 
the constraint of wishes; the simultaneous 
satisfaction of individual desires (id) and cultural 
demands (superego), et cetera are, according to 
Kaye, examples of the complex aspects of human 
nature and culture which cannot be reduced to or 
dismissed as a contradiction (FC, p. 91).  
It is equally false to identify Freud’s repression 
with suppression, which results in confusing the 
former with the externally imposed coercive 
force that suppresses the expression of desires of 
individuals; Freud regards culture as “a complex 
and delicately balanced array of forces, meanings, 
and images that attempt to rule nature, to regulate 
human relations, to master our ambivalent desires, 
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and to provide compensation for our unfulfilled 
wishes” (FC, p. 93); it is” neither an “unmoved 
mover“ nor a symbolic representation of social 
structure, but provides collective means for 
stabilizing, controlling, expressing, and ultimately 
transforming intrapsychic forces” (FC, p. 93).  It 
is also false to “attribute moral sentiments to an 
involuntary repression of envy and resentment–
feelings born of wounded narcissism–demanded 
by rational self-interest and by ‘identification with a 
superior being’ ” (FC, p. 93).
Another mistake was pointed out on the origin of 
the external social authority.  Freud’s myth of the 
primal horde does not simply perform the same 
function of Hobbesian state of nature as the cause 
of the external social authority, but it “attempts to 
explain the development of other forms of social 
order besides tyranny and other bases for social 
feeling besides fear and envy, namely guilt, the 
practical necessities of social life, and a shared 
identification with an ego ideal” (FC, p. 93). More 
fundamentally, narcissism in Freud is not simply 
antisocial and brutal selfishness that must be 
tamed by the social coercion; it is expressed in 
many forms including even “love relations with 
others” and “the narcissistic identification with 
shared cultural ideals” (FC, p. 94).8） 
Kaye’s criticism is also directed to the various 
stances of the Frankfurt school of social theorists, 
early and contemporary, which maintain basically 
that it is external social force that causes asocial 
or instinctual individuals to be social through 
internalization of its coercive powers in the form 
of repression, reason, and conscience (FC, p. 
95), or, more strongly, that human psyche is so 
deformed by social coercion that it becomes nearly 
impossible to oppose it, or, alternatively, that 
civilization represses human instinct and becomes 
the sources of its own destruction.  Such views, 
by their insistence on the opposition of instinctual 
and social/cultural nature and on the identity 
of repression with social/economic domination 
forces, “ignore other mechanisms of defense 
and expression such as projection, reaction 
formation, and sublimation” (FC, p. 95), and by 
their orientation toward Marxism, replace factory 
with dehumanizing civilization, the proletariat with 
the id, and alienation with instinctual discontent 
(FC, p. 95).  Habermas’ idea of the pathology 
born of repression and the possibility of a utopian 
end of alienation through communicative action 
in a free speech society is criticized as meaning, 
in Freud’s view, “only madness within and chaos 
without” (FC, p. 97); his view that human evil is an 
historical contingency that can be eliminated in the 
end goes counter to Freud’s theory that “consists 
of the notion of uneliminable, unconscious mental 
processes that are both creative and pathological 
in their effect, a theory of repression not reducible 
to economic necessity and social oppression, 
and an awareness of the vicissitudes to which 
ambivalent sexual and aggressive trends are 
prone in the lives of individuals and cultures” 
(FC, p. 98).  A similar criticism is made against 
Jessica Benjamin’s feminist theory, which insists 
that Hobbesian world driven by antisocial human 
nature but checked by the internalization of the 
social authority experienced as inner compulsion 
is a product of the ego that acts as an agent 
of patriarchal authority and represses cer tain 
impulses and emotions, and that elimination of 
destructive pathologies that such an ego develops 
necessitates that the patriarchal authority be 
lifted and replaced with the maternal nurturance 
(FC, p. 98).  But, Freud “believed that what is 
internalized is not confined to rules and to the 
real experience of terror, violence, and domination 
but also includes lost love objects, “with whom we 
identify–that is, images of loved persons and of our 
emotional relations with them” (FC, p. 98). Kaye 
points out that “the narcissistic longing for the 
mother may prove as problematic and pathologenic 
as the longing for the father” (FC, p. 99).
With respect to Parsons’ account of the process 
of internalization, Kaye points out that his view 
that internalization is a “relatively conflict-free, 
stable, and stabilizing form of socialization in 
which the rules of expectations are incorporated 
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into a fully social self” (p. 101) does not take into 
consideration the “inherently ambivalent nature 
of all internalization” (p. 101).  Freud’s insight 
that the superego is as much a function of one’s 
own aggressive and punitive fantasies turned 
against the self as it is a function of the real 
father experienced is omitted (FC, p. 101).  This 
insight is central to Freud’s cultural theory; “the 
superego and its moral passions are not simply a 
source of social control and integration, stability 
and harmony, but at times, may exert, profoundly 
destabilizing, disordering, and even culturally 
transformative forces” (FC, p. 101).  Also, Kaye 
is critical of the metaphor of structure and social 
structural determinism as developed by the 
followers of Parsons.
After reviewing many sociological interpreters of 
Freud, Kaye concludes:
 
In reading Freud’s sociological interpreters, 
one would never realize that Freud believed his 
most important contributions would be made 
in the cultural sciences, not in therapy.  Calling 
his “depth psychology” an “indispensable” 
instr ument for sociologists, historians of 
civilization, and psychologists of religion, Freud 
believed his “theory of the mental unconscious” 
could provide new insights into the sources of 
social feeling, social causes of neurosis, the role 
of social institutions in the mastery of unsatisfied 
wishes, and ultimately the nature and dynamics 
of culture. . . .  Instead Freudian theory has been 
rendered superfluous by faulty and incomplete 
sociological interpretations, and its central 
concepts and cultural theory have been emptied 
of meaning.  Thus much to our detriment, it 
has fallen from the ranks of living sociological 
theories.”    (FC, p. 102)
Now that Parsons’ theor y of internalization 
of  common nor mative values in the need-
dispositions of individuals and of the stability of 
a social system as dependent on this integration 
has been made clear along with Wrong’s and 
Kaye’s criticisms, we next turn to the question 
of how the institutionalization of man takes place 
through an historical process of socio-economic 
and cultural evolution.  We examine in sequence 
three related theories of this process, by Thorstein 
Veblen, Adam Smith, and Bourdieu, in the light 
of Parsons’ fundamental theorem of sociology. 
Veblen’s view of institutionalization of man is 
focused on the institutionalization of the canon of 
pecuniary reputability or honorific wastefulness. 
His theor y is par ticularly impor tant for our 
purpose as he addresses the very question of how 
man’s proclivity for emulation and the canon of 
pecuniary reputability, or, more generally, man’s 
emulative social nature, have come about through 
an historical process of cultural evolution, in 
which the instinct of workmanship, namely, the 
innate aptitude for productive work, habituates 
man’s apperceptive activity in perceiving beauty. 
The first principle of his theory is the instinct of 
workmanship, which should not be confused with 
a biological one.  In the following section we read 
and examine closely the most important part of his 
theory as expounded in The Theory of Leisure Class 
in order to discern his chain of thought.
4.   Veblen and the canon of conspicuous 
waste
In The Theory of Leisure Class (TLC hereafter), 
Veblen develops his theory of how the taste of 
conspicuous consumption has come about through 
a long history of cultural evolution. His theory 
does not take any assumption for granted as to 
what motivates human beings in their actions; men 
are not assumed to be  seekers of any kind, such as 
status-seekers, pleasure-seekers, profit-seekers, or 
utility-seekers. Rather his aim is to show how such 
motives, if they exist, have come to be ingrained in 
man’s social nature.  In this sense, his theory is an 
account of the evolutionary process through which 
the most prominent proclivity in human nature as 
it exists in our civilization has come about.
Starting with his observation on what he calls 
man’s instinct of workmanship, he shows how 
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this instinct works itself out through stages of 
social development and habituates our sense of 
beauty.  This instinct is not a biological instinct, 
but rather an aptitude to appreciate the merit of 
the serviceability and the efficiency of what man 
does for his end, over and against the demerit of 
the futility and the waste in man’s effort, which 
promotes invidious comparison and emulation 
between persons through demonstration of visible 
success.  He writes:
As a matter of selective necessity, man is an 
agent.  He is, in his own apprehension, a center 
of unfolding impulsive activity—“teleological” 
activity.  He is an agent seeking in every act the 
accomplishment of some concrete, objective, 
impersonal end.  By force of his being such an 
agent he is possessed of a taste for ef fective 
work, and a distaste for futile ef for t.  He 
has a sense of the merit of ser viceability or 
efficiency and of the demerit of futility, waste, or 
incapacity. This aptitude or propensity may be 
called the instinct of workmanship. Wherever 
the circumstances or traditions of life lead to 
an habitual comparison of one person with 
another in point of ef ficiency, the instinct of 
workmanship works out in an emulative or 
invidious comparison of persons.  The extent 
to which this result follows depends in some 
considerable degree on the temperament of the 
population.  In any community where such an 
invidious comparison of persons is habitually 
made, visible success becomes an end sought 
for its own utility as a basis of esteem.  Esteem 
is gained and dispraise is avoided by putting 
one’s efficiency in evidence.  The result is that 
the instinct of workmanship works out in an 
emulative demonstration of force. (TLC, pp. 
29–30)
In the primitive phase of social development (the 
peaceable barbarian or savagery stage), whose 
evidence is more psychological than ethnological, 
the incentive and the scope of emulation, mostly 
working through industrial ser viceability, is 
limited.  When industrial methods increase the 
ef ficiency of production and leave a margin of 
product worth fighting for, this phase moves on 
to a predatory phase, in which emulation gains 
in scope and urgency as invidious comparison 
now praises exploit and acquisition by war and 
seizure higher than industrial employment, which 
is increasingly looked down as irksome and as 
lacking dignity.  This predatory culture can be 
supported only if the predatory attitude becomes 
habituated and spiritualized among the members 
of the society.  What separates this stage from the 
earlier one is, therefore, the spiritual appraisal 
that goes to exploit and seizure made possible by 
higher industrial productivity (TLC, pp. 30–32).
For Veblen, “the point in question is the origin 
and the nature of a conventional leisure class on 
the one hand and the beginnings of individual 
ownership as a conventional right or equitable 
claim on the other hand” (TLC, p. 33).  And, 
he explicates how they emerge through social 
development.
The above phase of ownership of property by 
way of acquisition and seizure passes into the 
quasi-peaceable phase of an incipient organization 
of industr y and private proper ty, in which 
accumulation of wealth becomes a common basis 
of esteem in the community while the highest 
honors are still granted on predatory or quasi-
predatory ef ficiency in war or statecraft (TLC, 
pp. 36–38).  If wealth becomes the source of 
popular esteem, it also becomes the source of self-
respect.  The acquisition of wealth therefore sets in 
motion a never-ending process of the struggle for 
a higher relative standing against competitors in 
the community.  Now the instinct of workmanship 
is channelled into a straining race for pecuniary 
achievement  (TLC, pp. 38–40).9）
The struggle of pecuniary reputability works 
in dif ferent directions for dif ferent classes. 
While this struggle takes the form of increased 
diligence and parsimony for those whose actions 
are bounded to field of productive efficiency, the 
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dominant incentive of the superior pecuniary class 
is the gaining of abstention from productive work, 
for this work is now considered debasing to a 
spiritual human life; through the predatory phase, 
productive work has become associated with a 
mark of weakness, subjection, and inferiority (TLC, 
pp. 41–42).
Thus, in the predatory phase and in the early 
par t of the succeeding quasi-peaceable stage, 
the life of leisure establishes itself as the most 
definitive evidence of pecuniar y achievement 
and reputability. Wealth consists predominantly 
of slaves at these stages, and their services and 
products make conspicuous abstention from 
labor possible for the superior class.  Pecuniary 
emulation of this exemption from useful labor 
continues to inhibit the habits of industry and thrift 
or the instinct of workmanship.  Wealth as a direct 
meritorious measure of social standing is now 
taken over by insistence on the exemption from 
productive labor.  The life of the leisure class thus 
becomes institutionalized with all its honorific and 
meritorious requisites (TLC, pp. 43–45).10）  Veblen 
is explicit on this point:
. . . According to well-established laws of human 
nature, prescription presently seizes upon this 
conventional evidence of wealth and fixes it in 
men’s habits of thought as something that is in 
itself substantially meritorious and ennobling; 
while productive labor at the same time and 
by a like process becomes in a double sense 
intrinsically unworthy. Prescription ends by 
making labor not only disreputable in the eyes 
of the community, but morally impossible to the 
noble, freeborn man, and incompatible with a 
worthy life. (TLC, pp. 44–45)
With the institutionalization of the leisure 
class comes refinement of a code of decorum 
(refined tastes, manners, and habits of life).  While 
manners, both as a symbolic expression of the 
relation of status and as a sign of gentility, are 
intrinsically good, the ulterior economic ground of 
a code of decorum lies in the honorific character of 
leisure; it takes time and effort to refine manners 
and to cultivate tastes for them, and demonstration 
of them evidences that a good portion of the time 
of the leisure class has been spent in acquiring 
them; they are, therefore, the “voucher of a life 
of leisure.”  If so, acquisition of the proficiency in 
decorum becomes an effective and irreplaceable 
means to demonstrate the life of pecuniary decency 
(TLC, p. 49).  The race for this proficiency leads 
to the cultivation of decorum in many details and 
to the development of a comprehensive discipline 
as a social norm.  Thus, conspicuous leisure 
grows into a detailed code of decorum as well as 
into discriminate tastes on the decorous nature of 
consumption (TLC, p. 50).  And, this development 
of conspicuous leisure is also accompanied by a 
syncopated evolution of gentle birth and breeding.
In the “quasi-peaceable” stage of cultural 
development, still under the pressure of coercion 
and class antagonism, personal service becomes 
an important economic institution for consumption 
purposes.  Initially, leisure is performed vicariously 
by housewives and menials for their masters. 
As competition for conspicuous leisure gains in 
scope, there emerges a subsidiary leisure class 
comprised of servants of various grades with a 
division of labor among them; these ser vants 
spend vicariously the leisure of their masters or 
corporate households all for the demonstration of 
the pecuniary reputability of the leisure class (TLC, 
pp. 56–59).
Parallel to the development of the institution 
of conspicuous leisure is the beginning of a 
differentiation in consumption based on pecuniary 
strengths in the earlier quasi-peaceable stage. 
As competition for conspicuous leisure becomes 
increasingly strenuous, gentlemen of leisure turns 
to consumption as another means of demonstration 
of their pecuniar y reputability, seizing those 
innovations that turn out more elaborate goods 
for consumption.  They cultivate their tastes and 
learn to discriminate the noble from the ignoble 
among goods for consumption.  How to live a life of 
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ostensible leisure by demonstrating refined tastes 
for manners and through consumption of valuable 
goods becomes just as important as demonstrating 
conspicuous leisure. Thus, conspicuous leisure 
and conspicuous consumption become the social 
norms to be conformed to for the leisure class 
(TLC, pp. 60–64).
As wealth accumulates and as conspicuous 
leisure and consumption is increasingly refined, 
the leisure class becomes dif ferentiated with a 
system of ranks and grades, which is furthered 
by inheritance of wealth and gentility.  With the 
proper leisure class in point of birth and wealth 
at the top, there emerge hierarchical classes of 
impecunious or half-caste gentlemen of leisure 
with various degrees of dependence on the upper 
classes.  These lower classes become various 
consumers of their patrons.
At the same time, with the emergence of this 
hierarchy of social classes, there arises the norm of 
reputability set by the leisure class at the top, with 
the scheme of life of the upper class playing a role 
of an ideal to be aspired to by the lower class (TLC, 
pp. 65–70).11） Moreover, Veblen observes that the 
proclivity to use the serviceability of consumption 
as a means of repute will be greater the wider the 
human contact and the more mobile the population 
(TLC, p. 72).
We mention in passing that the emergence of 
this kind of a social status ladder, in which the 
lower classes seek to emulate the higher status 
groups and in which the norm of reputability is set 
by the highest group, will be of great importance 
to our model of status emulation and avoidance via 
reference groups and of endogenous formation 
of social preferences, which will be explored in a 
separate paper.  Also, Veblen’s observation that the 
mobility of the population (which affects the width 
of the human contact) influences the proclivity 
to use consumption for invidious comparison will 
be considered as one of the factors to shape the 
emulation-avoidance pattern of a status seeking 
individual in this exploration.
This theory of Veblen’s regarding the devel-
opment of a hierarchical social differentiation and 
emulative conformity to the social norm of aspiring 
to the ways of life of the upper class is one of the 
most significant implications of his instinct of 
workmanship working out in invidious comparison. 
On this very point, Veblen states:
. . . Other circumstances permitting, that instinct 
disposes men to look with favor upon productive 
efficiency and on whatever is of human use. It 
disposes them to deprecate waste of substance 
or ef for t. The instinct of workmanship is 
present in all men, and asserts itself even under 
very adverse circumstances.  So that however 
wasteful a given expenditure may be in reality, it 
must at least have some colorable excuse in the 
way of an ostensible purpose.  . . . (TLC, p. 75)
. . . but when the quasi-peaceable stage (with 
slavery and status) passes into the peaceable 
stage of industry (with wage labor and cash 
payment) the instinct comes more effectively 
into play.  It then begins aggressively to shape 
men’s views of what is meritorious, and assets 
itself at least as an auxiliar y canon of self 
complacency.  . . . (TLC, p. 76)
Again Veblen’s theory of hierarchical differentia-
tion of social classes and institutionalization of 
consumption norms will be considered in our later 
attempt to model endogenous formation of social 
preferences in an emulative culture.
Veblen also observes that reputable consump-
tion is necessarily wasteful; that no standard 
of expenditure, or no norm of consumption, 
would develop from sole insistence on the bare 
necessaries of life; and that invidious comparison 
in other dimensions of life are indistinguishably 
bound up with the pecuniary comparison (TLC, 
pp. 77–78).12）  Veblen is viewing consumption as 
a dynamic evolutionary force constantly reaching 
beyond the basic needs of life through various 
forms of wasteful consumption.
On the notion of conspicuous waste, Veblen 
makes a point that the elements of use and 
17HAYAKAWA：Institutionalization of Common Normative Values and Economics of Limited Cognition in Search for . . .
waste are mixed in actual goods.  Because 
all expenditures, whether made for invidious 
pecuniar y comparison or for other purposes, 
conduce to the consumer’s gratification, the 
real test of invidious comparison is whether an 
expenditure in question enhances human life taken 
impersonally (TLC, p. 79).  But, in real life, the 
elements of use and waste are included in varying 
degrees in goods, with the wasteful element being 
dominating consumable goods (TLC, pp. 79–80). 
This implies that in building a model of norm-
guided preferences under Veblenian emulation 
and avoidance, we need to address the task of 
identifying these two elements in consumer goods, 
particularly, in those of durable nature.
Veblen’s view on the life process as an open 
process of unfolding activity with formation 
of habits and also on a standard of living as 
comprised of various habits is critical.  Men have 
different aptitudes in unfolding their life activities, 
and in this life process various habits of expression 
are formed.  But, certain habits, which “coincide 
with or proceed upon a relatively strong specific 
aptitude or a relatively great specific facility of 
expression become of great consequence to the 
man’s well-being” (TLC, p. 84).  In particular, the 
habits facilitated by those aptitudes or propensities 
for emulation are of this consequence.  In an 
invidious culture, the propensity for emulation 
is of ancient growth, and the ability to pay 
constantly seeks expression along accredited 
lines of conspicuous consumption, thereby 
forming corresponding habits.  This explains the 
reluctance to curtail conspicuous consumption 
under counteracting circumstances (TLC, pp. 
82–85). We note in passing that this Veblen’s view 
resonates with a modern socio-economic theory 
of Duesenberry’s relative income hypothesis, in 
which consumption behavior is explained by the 
relative ability to pay and the non-reversibility of 
consumption over time called the ratchet effects 
[Duesenberry (1949)].
Veblen’s theory of the life process in an invidious 
pecuniary culture is most succinctly stated in the 
following passage, in which consumption as a 
means of communicating one’s relative standing in 
the scale of living is suggested.
The accepted standard of expenditure in the 
community or in the class to which a person 
belongs largely determines what his standard 
of living will be.  It does this directly by 
commending itself to his common sense as right 
and good, through his habitually contemplating 
it and assimilating the scheme of life in which it 
belongs; but it does so also indirectly through 
popular insistence on conformity to the accepted 
scale of expenditure as a matter of propriety, 
under pain of disesteem and ostracism.  To 
accept and practice the standard of living which 
is in vogue is both agreeable and expedient, 
commonly to the point of being indispensable 
to personal comfort and to success in life.  The 
standard of living of any class, so far as concerns 
the element of conspicuous waste, is commonly 
as high as the earning capacity of the class will 
permit–with a constant tendency to go higher. 
The effect upon the serious activities of men is 
therefore to direct them with great singleness 
of purpose to the largest possible acquisition 
of wealth, and to discountenance work that 
brings no pecuniary gain.  At the same time 
the ef fect on consumption is to concentrate 
it upon the lines which are most patent to the 
observers whose good opinion is sought; while 
the inclinations and aptitudes whose exercise 
does not involve a honorific expenditure of time 
or substance tend to fall into abeyance through 
disuse.   (TLC, p. 86)
In Veblen’s thought, man’s habits are complex 
but they are interrelated to one another: “Habits of 
thought with respect to the expression of life in any 
given direction unavoidably affect the habitual view 
of what is good and right in life in other directions 
also.  In the organic complex of habits of thought 
which make up the substance of an individual’s 
conscious life the economic interest does not 
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lie isolated and distinct from all other interests” 
(TLC, p. 88).  The case in point is the canon of 
conspicuous or honorific waste, which unavoidably 
traverses habitually the canons of moral conduct, 
beauty, utility, ritualistic fitness, and even scientific 
sense of truth in the community.  One such 
example is clearly seen in the institution of the 
sacredness of private property traversed by the 
habit of accumulating wealth for its reputable value 
of conspicuous consumption  (TLC, p. 88–89).  He 
continues:
. . . all that considerable body of morals that 
clusters about the concept of an inviolable 
ownership is itself a psychological precipitate of 
the traditional meritoriousness of wealth.  And it 
should be added that this wealth which is held 
sacred is valued primarily for the sake of the 
good repute to be got through its conspicuous 
consumption. (TLC, p. 91)
Another example of the influences of the canons 
of reputability is found in the popular sense of 
what is useful and beautiful, or more generally, 
what is serviceable in consumable goods.  The 
superior article is appreciated more often for its 
superior honorific serviceability than for its brute 
beauty or utility.  Consciously or unconsciously, 
the cannons of conspicuous waste are traversing 
our sense of what is beautiful and are guiding 
our discrimination of consuming articles (TLC, p. 
95).  This is how the beautiful and the honorific 
meet and blend; it is no longer easy to separate 
the intrinsic beauty of beautiful things from the 
pecuniarily honorific service that their possession 
confers on the possessors.  The beauty of an object, 
under this blending, subsumes both features, its 
expensiveness and its beautiful features.  Such is 
the case with many consumable articles such as 
dress and household furniture (TLC, pp. 95–97).13）
The notion of beauty in this blended sense 
is not uniform among dif ferent classes.  Just as 
classes are dif ferentiated with their own norms 
of reputability, so are matters of taste allowing 
for diverse views on what is beautiful.  “It is not 
a constitutional dif ference of endowments in 
the aesthetic respect, but rather a dif ference 
in the code of reputability which specifies what 
objects properly lie within the scope of honorific 
consumption for the class to which the critic 
belongs” (TLC, pp. 98). This implies that the 
objects of the honorific consumption themselves 
depend on where the consuming critic is located 
in the social status ladder.  Any model of status 
emulation needs to incorporate this dynamic 
feature of status emulation.
On the psychological basis of the blending of 
the beautiful and the honorific, Veblen’s thought is 
clear:  Long and close habituation makes the mind 
to unfold its apperceptive activity of perceiving 
beauty in certain directions.  While the economic 
interest in the constitution of beauty of an object 
is focused on its ef ficiency in facilitating the 
material ends of life, “the canons of beauty must 
be circumvented by some contrivance which will 
give evidence of a reputably wasteful expenditure, 
at the same time that it meets the demand of our 
critical sense of the useful and the beautiful” (TCL, 
p. 109).  Such circumvented sense of taste is called 
the sense of novelty, directed at those objects that 
combine ingenuity, ostensible economic end, and 
pecuniary waste (TLC, pp. 109–110).  Thus, the 
generic element of beauty is traversed by the sense 
of novelty, resulting “in making the physiognomy of 
our objects of tastes a congeries of idiosyncrasies” 
yet subject to “the selective surveillance of the 
canon of expensiveness” (TLC, p. 110).  This 
theory, combining (a) the apperceptive activity of 
the mind, (b) long habituation of this activity in 
an invidious culture, and (c) the blending of the 
generic and the honorific beauty in forming the 
sense of taste for the novel, provides the basis of 
Veblen’s evolutionary view of social and cultural 
development.14）
If our sense of beauty is the blended of the 
generic and the honorific beauty, our tastes 
for consumable goods and our notions of the 
ser viceability of such goods cannot escape its 
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impact. Because consumption is an ef fective 
means for emulation in an invidious culture, 
consumable goods are now invested not only with 
their economic efficiency in serving the material 
ends of human life but also with their social and 
cultural serviceability in emulating higher status 
classes and in demonstrating the relative ability 
to pay of the critic. The goods serving the second 
end must show adequate marks of superfluous 
costliness beyond the brute efficiency.  If goods 
can be measured by utility, their utility now comes 
from two sources.15） If consumers are habituated 
to look for the marks of honorific conspicuousness, 
producers of goods direct their ef for ts to the 
meeting of this demand (TLC, pp. 112–113).  More 
importantly, the effectiveness of goods as a means 
of emulation is no longer independent of the social 
context in which man exercises his choice on 
consumable goods; often it is the case that goods 
effective in this sense under one culture are not 
as effective in another. Veblen is here breaking 
the conventional dichotomy between values/
preferences and choice objects; how one values 
choice objects for their effectiveness as a means 
of invidious comparison is intimately bound to the 
social context in which such comparison is made, 
which is to say that preferences are convoluted 
with the facts of social and cultural norms of 
emulation. This will be one of the most important 
facts we take into account in building our model of 
preference formation in the social context later. 
The canon of taste for the honorific or the 
wasteful is forcefully ingrained in the mind of the 
consumers that they make it their habit to look 
upon wasteful expensiveness as the measure of 
honorific decency and to degrade cheap things 
as dishonorable.  And, “any retrogression from 
the standard of living which we are accustomed 
to regard as worthy in this respect is felt to be 
grievous violation of our human dignity” (TLC, p. 
112).
But, the canon of taste for waste does not imply 
that the wasteful goods lack evidence of skillful 
workmanship or ingenuity; it is quite the contrary. 
Skillful workmanship or ingenuity is normally the 
ground on which to screen goods selectively for 
their honorific serviceability. In this sense, the 
canon of conspicuous waste works as a selective 
principle, rather than as a generative principle, 
for variation and growth.16） Whenever innovative 
articles or methods are introduced, the canon of 
conspicuous waste serves to select such forms 
as are suitable as ef fective means of invidious 
comparison (TLC, p. 118).  Veblen is clear on this 
point:
The position of machine products in the 
civilized scheme of consumption serves to point 
out the nature of the relation which subsists 
between the canon of conspicuous waste and the 
code of proprieties in consumption.  Neither in 
matters of art and taste proper, nor as regards 
the current sense of the serviceability of goods, 
does this canon act as a principle of innovation 
or initiative.  It does not go into the future as 
a creative principle which makes innovations 
and adds new items of consumption and new 
elements of costs.  The principle in question is, in 
a certain sense, a negative rather than a positive 
law.  It is a regulative rather than a creative 
principle.  It very rarely initiates or originates 
any usage or custom directly.  Its action is 
selective only.  . . . The law of conspicuous waste 
does not account for the origin of variations, 
but only for the persistence of such forms as 
are fit to survive under its dominance.  It acts to 
conserve the fit, not to originate the acceptable. 
Its office is to prove all things and to hold fast 
that which is good for its purpose. (TLC, p. 118)
Veblen’s thought that the canon of pecuniary 
waste is not a creative principle but rather a 
negative and regulative principle follows from his 
position that it is from the instinct of workmanship 
(man’s taste for productive work and distaste 
for futile effort) that man’s sense of beauty, art, 
proper conduct, and the propriety of consumption 
comes about by habituation of the sense of beauty 
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through a long history of cultural evolution.  In his 
view, therefore, the canon of conspicuous waste is 
rather a product (or an emerged pattern of tastes) 
than a cause of cultural evolution.  But, as this 
passage implies, Veblen suggests that the instinct 
of workmanship is the source of two principles 
of major importance in cultural evolution, one 
positive and creative as the principle of innovation 
and the other negative and regulative as the 
principle of selection.  While man creates new and 
refined goods because of his innate desire to do 
so, other men as consumers, with their habituated 
tastes for the novelty, evaluate and screen them for 
their serviceability as effective means of invidious 
comparison. What course an actual process of 
cultural evolution takes, therefore, depends on 
an intricate and continuing interaction of the two 
principles.
Such is Veblen’s theory of cultural evolution and 
the emergence of the leisure class and the cannon 
of conspicuous waste. Starting with the instinct 
of workmanship (man’s sense of the merit of 
productive effort and the demerit of the contrary), 
Veblen argues how this instinct, initially working 
out in an emulative or invidious comparison 
between persons, (1) habituates our apperceptive 
activity to perceive beauty and our tastes for 
invidious comparison through succeeding phases 
of cultural development, (2) contributes to a 
hierarchical dif ferentiation of social classes, (3) 
brings forth the institution of private property to 
honor accumulation of wealth as a basis of esteem, 
(4) cultivates our sense of what is beautiful by 
blending the generic and the honorific beauty, 
thereby forming our conjoined tastes for both the 
brute ef ficiency and the honorific reputability, 
and (5) solidifies the canon of conspicuous waste 
as a selective principle that screens innovative 
goods and methods for the evidence of their 
honorific serviceability. Particularly important 
is Veblen’s notion that through long habituation 
the canons of conspicuous waste traverse the 
canons of beauty to develop the sense of novelty 
which guides our discrimination of consuming 
articles for both ingenuity and pecuniary waste. It 
is a theory of the emergence, the evolution, and 
the institutionalization of the leisure class and 
the canon of conspicuous waste supporting it, 
but, more importantly, it is a dialectical theory of 
instinct and habituation setting in motion, under 
industrial growth, an evolutionary process of a 
cultural development, in which man’s quest for 
invidious comparison and esteem in   society is 
just as important as the attainment of impartial 
well-being.  It is also an evolutionary theory of 
the genesis of preferences in the individual self, 
or a dynamic theory of the internalization of the 
norm of the canon of conspicuous waste into 
the motivational structure of the self by way of 
habituation. Veblen’s theory brings to light that 
the conventional economic theory, whose premise 
is that preferences are given, is incomplete as an 
explanator y account of human action in socio-
cultural contexts in which the proclivity to gain 
in social status and esteem incessantly seeks 
and finds its new expressions through access to 
novel routes to pecuniary reputability.  Moreover, 
Veblen’s theory provides an excellent example of 
the general proposition that the linkage between 
actions of individual persons under cultural 
influences and the emergence of cultural patterns 
cannot be understood fully without analyzing how 
tastes or the sense of beauty are shaped by cultural 
norms and how such norms are brought forth or 
reproduced dynamically through voluntary actions 
of individuals.
5.   Adam Smith’s moral sentiments and 
Veblen’s proclivity for emulation
Veblen’s theory of invidious pecuniary comparison 
has much to share with Adam Smith’s theory of the 
sentiment of approbation for emulation; in fact, this 
theory, in many ways, is a precursor to Veblen’s. 
We now capture closely what Adam Smith has to 
say in Part IV of The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(hereafter, TMS) and compare it with Veblen’s 
theory of invidious culture.  Adam Smith starts 
the first chapter of this part with the following 
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statement:  
That utility is one of the principal sources 
of beauty has been obser ved by ever ybody, 
who has considered with any attention what 
constitutes the nature of beauty. (TMS, p. 257) 
But, going beyond the idea that it is the utility 
of an object that pleases its possessor whose 
sentiment is shared by the spectator by way of 
sympathy, Adam Smith holds:
 
But that this fitness, this happy contrivance 
of any production of art, should often be more 
valued, than the ver y end for which it was 
intended; and that the exact adjustment of the 
means for attaining any conveniency or pleasure, 
should frequently be more regarded, than that 
very conveniency or pleasure, in the attainment 
of which their whole merit would seem to 
consist, has not, so far as I know, been yet taken 
notice of by any body.  That this, however, is 
very frequently the case, may be observed in a 
thousand instances, both in the most frivolous 
and in the most important concerns of human 
life. (TMS, p. 258) 
And, his example speaks well for this sentiment.
A watch, in the same manner, that falls behind 
above two minutes in a day, is despised by one 
curious in watches. He sells it perhaps for a 
couple of guineas, and purchases another at 
fifty, which will not lose above a minute in a 
fortnight.  The sole use of watches, however, 
is to tell us what o’clock it is, and to hinder us 
from breaking any engagement, or suf fering 
any other inconveniency by our ignorance in 
that particular point.  But the person so nice 
with regard to this machine, will not always be 
found either more scrupulously punctual than 
other men, or more anxiously concerned upon 
any other account, to know precisely what time 
of day it is.  What interests him is not so much 
the attainment of this piece of knowledge, as the 
perfection of the machine which serves to attain 
it. (TMS, p. 259)
But, it is this subtle dif ference that makes an 
enormous difference in the way the economy works 
out its order.  The utility of articles of conveniency 
cannot be a perpetual drive to attain ever new ones 
that contribute to beautiful arrangements serving 
as objects of admiration by spectators, because this 
utility, being rather limited, is not worth fighting 
for.  When a poor man is exposed to the display of 
articles of conveniency by the rich, there arises in 
him a perpetual ambition to pursue wealth through 
unceasing industry. Man’s endeavors to acquire 
talents, professions, better jobs and his willingness 
to bear the required burden of hardship and 
sacrifice all originate in this ambition, although 
those obser vable ar ticles of vanity sought so 
earnestly do not yield much of the conveniency 
dreamed of, in comparison with cheaper articles of 
similar utility (TMS, pp. 259–261)
The principal cause of this quest for elegant 
contrivances as means of happiness is rooted in our 
proclivity to pay more attention to the sentiments 
of other people for our mode of living and in our 
belief that such fancy contrivances are objects of 
their admiration and applaud, although this belief 
is separate from how much they contribute to the 
happiness of their masters (TMS; pp. 261–262). 
Smith writes:
. . . If we consider the real satisfaction which 
all these things are capable of af fording, by 
itself and separated from the beauty of that 
arrangement which is fitted to promote it, 
it will always appear in the highest degree 
contemptible and trifling.  But we rarely view 
it in this abstract and philosophical light.  We 
naturally confound it in our imagination with the 
order, the regular and harmonious movement of 
the system, the machine or economy by means 
of which it is produced.  The pleasures of wealth 
and greatness, when considered in this complex 
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view, strike the imagination as something grand 
and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment 
is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we 
are so apt to bestow upon it. (TMS, p. 263).
Smith calls this confounding of satisfaction 
(in the sense of utility), beauty (in the sense of 
the arrangement), and order (in the sense of the 
harmony of the economy) a deception that “rouses 
and keeps in motion the industry of mankind“; it is 
the source of all sorts of innovations that embellish 
our life and push the frontiers of sciences and 
arts.  But, this deception is part of Providence: 
Our economy expands through this quest for 
more elegant contrivances, and the order of the 
economy never loses its harmony as the wealthy, 
whose stomach is far less than their desires for 
conveniency, consume only a small but the most 
precious portion of the output produced while the 
rest trickles down to lower levels to feed those who 
actually produce the trinkets and baubles enjoyed 
by the great (TMS, p. 263–264).  Smith continues:
. . . They are led by an invisible hand to make 
nearly the same distribution of the necessaries 
of life, which would have been made, had the 
earth been divided into equal portions among 
all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, 
without knowing it, advance the interest of the 
society, and afford means to the multiplication of 
the species.  When Providence divided the earth 
among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor 
abandaned those who seemed to have been left 
out in the partition. (TMS, pp. 264–265).
Smith also notes that our love for the beauty of 
order and elegant contrivances extends to our 
desire for better institutions that promote the 
public welfare (p. 265–268).
On the origin of ambition and the distinction 
of ranks, Smith has a separate chapter (Chapter 
II) in section III of Part I of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (pp. 70–83).  His argument rests 
on the premise that “it is because mankind are 
disposed to sympathize more entirely with our 
joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of 
our riches, and conceal our poverty”, and that “it 
is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of 
mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty” 
(TMS, p. 70).  The end of our ambition is to seek 
conveniences and to better our life; it is to derive 
from it the advantages of sympathy, complacency, 
and approbation from other people.  But, this 
vanity is founded on our belief that we are exposed 
to the attention and the approbation of other 
people.  So, “the rich man glorifies in his riches”, 
and “the poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of 
his poverty” (TMS, p. 71) And, “the poor man goes 
out and comes in unheeded” (TMS, p. 71) and, 
“the man of rank and distinction, on the contrary, 
is obser ved by all the world” (TMS, p. 72). 
Essentially, it is this observation by other fellows, 
“which, notwithstanding the restraint it imposes, 
notwithstanding the loss of liberty with which it is 
attended, renders greatness the object of envy, and 
compensates, in the opinion of mankind, all that 
toil, all that anxiety, all those mortifications, which 
must be undergone in the pursuit of it; and what is 
of yet more consequence, all that leisure, all that 
ease, all that careless security, which are forfeited 
for ever by the acquisition” (TMS, p. 72). 
But, our disposition to emulate the rich and the 
powerful and to avoid the poor and the mean is 
not without serious consequences on our moral 
sentiments.  Smith firmly states: 
This disposition to admire, and almost to 
worship the rich and the power ful, and to 
despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor 
and mean condition, though necessary both to 
establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks 
and the order of society, is, at the same time, the 
great and most universal cause of the corruption 
of our moral sentiments. (TMS, p. 84)
We desire the admiration of mankind, either by 
taking the road to wisdom and virtue, for which 
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the admirers are of a select few, or by taking the 
road to wealth and greatness, for which there 
is no shortage of admirers.  How the two roads 
diverge depends on the stations of life.  In the 
inferior stations in which the greater par t of 
mankind find themselves, men are prudent in 
seeking professional abilities and obser ve the 
rules of justice; moral sentiments from neighbors 
reinforce virtues of prudence and justice.  In the 
superior stations of life, where in peaceful times 
the success depends on winning the favor of proud 
and vain superiors, however, the great vir tues 
are tamed by “the external graces, the frivolous 
accomplishments of that impertinent and foolish 
thing called a man of fashion” (TMS, p. 87).  But, 
because of our disposition to emulate the rich, 
the superior stations of life are enabled to set the 
fashion or the decorum including vices and follies, 
which are imitated by the greater part of men who 
desire to be thought rich by imitating it despite 
their humble stations.  Thus the fashion, through 
envy, causes the road to the fortune to diverge 
from that to the great vir tues as men become 
ambitious at seeking higher stations of life under 
the illusion that the aspired higher stations of life, 
if achieved, will afford the winner the luster of a 
more generous living and thereby earn the respect 
and admiration of mankind (TMS, p. 88–90). If 
this observation by Adam Smith is compared with 
Veblen’s theory of an invidious culture in which 
the norm of honorific consumption is set by the 
highest status class and is emulated by the lower 
ones, the similarity between the two is obvious.
Moral sentiments are also af fected by the 
principles of custom and fashion, which can 
cause different judgments of beauty to emerge in 
different ages and nations.  When different things 
are observed together repeatedly, our imagination 
puts these ideas in a certain arrangement that 
excites our sense of beauty, and habituates our 
mind to appreciate this connection in similar 
situations.  From this habituation arises our 
custom for connecting dif ferent things and our 
feeling for the propriety or the impropriety of 
different combinations of things.  As a particular 
species of custom, a fashion, initiated by those 
in high ranks of life in whatever area, is viewed 
genteel and magnificent by virtue of its connection 
“in our imaginations with the idea of something 
that is genteel and magnificent.”  As this fashion 
is emulated by inferior ranks of people, it acquires 
the character of meanness and awkwardness and 
loses its grace it once had.17）  Custom and fashion 
are an extensive principle as their influence covers 
all objects of choice; modes of dress, furniture, 
poetry, music, architecture, manners, and so on. 
They even influence our judgments of the beauty of 
natural objects, as in our appreciation of a certain 
middle or the general pattern with respect to the 
features of things, animate or inanimate.  Smith 
continues:
Such is the system of this lear ned and 
ingenious father, concerning the nature of 
beauty; of which the whole charm, according to 
him, would thus seem to arise from its falling 
in with the habits which custom had impressed 
upon the imagination, with regard to things of 
each particular kind. (TMS, p. 288)
. . . But though I cannot admit that custom 
is the sole principle of beauty, yet I can so far 
allow the truth of this ingenious system, as 
to grant that there is scarce any one external 
form so beautiful as to please, if quite contrary 
to custom, and unlike whatever we have been 
used to in that particular species of things; or 
so deformed as not to be agreeable, if custom 
uniformly supports it, and habituates us to see it in 
every single individual of the kind. (TMS, p. 289) 
                                                        
Our notion of the beauty of human conduct is 
not exempt from the influence of the power of 
custom and habit. But, because our sentiments 
of moral approbation and disapprobation are 
rooted in vigorous passions of human nature, this 
influence is not expected to be so great.  Noting 
that the nature of this influence is similar to that in 
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other cases, Smith observes:
. . . To superficial minds, the vices of the great 
seem at all times agreeable.  They connect 
them, not only with the splendour of fortune, but 
with many superior virtues which they ascribe 
to their superiors; with the spirit of freedom 
and independency, with frankness, generosity, 
humanity, and politeness. The vir tues of the 
inferior ranks of people, on the contrary, their 
parsimonious frugality, their painful industry, 
and rigid adherence to rules, seem to them 
mean and disagreeable.  They connect them 
both with the meanness of the station to which 
those qualities commonly belong, and with 
many great vices which, they suppose, usually 
accompany them–such as an abject, cowardly, ill-
natured, lying, pilfering disposition. (TMS, pp. 
291–292)
Men in the same age, working with dif ferent 
objects in different professions, ranks, and stages 
of life, are habituated by custom to acquire certain 
passions and develop those favorable moral 
sentiments that reinforce those qualities that are 
important to their characters.  Men in dif ferent 
ages and countries, likewise, acquire dif ferent 
passions and characters, all according to their 
situations.  So, in barbarous and civilized nations, 
dif ferent custom habituate dif ferent passions 
with different rules of decorum.  But, as in other 
species of things, neither too much nor too little 
of such features is particularly pleasing.  On this 
middle conformation, Smith writes:
. . . Ever y age and countr y look upon the 
degree of each quality, which is commonly to 
be met with in those who are esteemed among 
themselves, as the golden mean of that particular 
talent or virtue. And as this varies, according as 
their dif ferent circumstances render dif ferent 
qualities more or less habitual to them, their 
sentiments concerning the exact propriety of 
character and behavior vary accordingly. (TMS, 
pp. 296–297) 
With his obser vation of these influences of 
custom and habit on our moral sentiments, Smith 
assures that such influences are not considerable 
and that “it is not concerning the general style 
of character and behavior that those principles 
produce the greatest per version of judgment, 
but concerning the propriety or impropriety of 
particular usages” (TMS, pp. 302–303).  The reason 
for this limitation is clear for him:  No society in 
which the usual practices of human conduct are 
horrible enough to destroy it would not subsist 
a moment (TMS, p. 306).  Yet, “with regard to 
particular usages, its influence is often much more 
destructive of good morals, and it is capable of 
establishing, as lawful and blameless, particular 
actions, which shock the plainest principles of right 
and wrong” (TMS, p. 304).
These words of Adam Smith resonate with 
Veblen’s theory of an invidious culture in which the 
apperceptive activity of the mind is habituated to 
admire goods for invidious purposes.  While Veblen 
addresses how our instinct for workmanship 
habituates our tastes of beauty for the honorific 
reputability, invidious comparison, and conspicuous 
waste, Smith starts with his version of the instinct 
of workmanship that aims at the per fection of 
articles of conveniency and that values the fitness 
of such articles more than the end or the utility 
for which they are produced.  The new and more 
elegant contrivances, when displayed to the 
view of common men, become the objects to be 
acquired for admiration and applaud by others. 
For Adam Smith, the instinct is the source of 
constant innovations and our perpetual quest for 
wealth.  As new contrivances are produced and 
acquired by the wealthy, people of lower ranks 
try to acquire them as a means  to emulate the 
rich.  Running parallel to this instinct are the moral 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation that 
are habituated to admire the rich and despise the 
poor.  Corrupted as such sentiments may be, they, 
nonetheless, shape our desire to seek the articles 
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of conveniency, thereby making it possible for 
enough employments to be created for all people 
of the society.  Custom and fashion, by habituating 
both our tastes for things of conveniency and moral 
sentiments in certain directions depending on the 
circumstances, may take men to particular usages 
of things and conduct that deviate from the natural 
beauty and the principles of right and wrong but 
never to the detriment of the fundamental moral 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation; 
it  may be said that habituated custom and 
fashion channel the social force of innovation 
and emulation and mediate the dynamic force of 
economic growth with expanding opportunities 
of employment.  To emulate the rich to gain the 
reputation of the higher status at the expense of all 
the toil of labor is part of a grand deception, but it 
is the cause of the quest for as well as the creation 
of wealth through proliferation of productive 
activities of mankind.  The satisfaction that the 
articles of conveniency afford is confounded, in his 
own words, “in our imagination with the order, the 
regular and harmonious movement of the system, 
the machine or economy by means of which it is 
produced. The pleasures of wealth and greatness, 
when considered in this complex view, strike the 
imagination as something grand and beautiful and 
noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the 
toil and anxiety which are so apt to bestow upon it” 
(TMS, p. 263).
This  theor y of  Adam Smith’s  regarding 
the instinct of workmanship as the source of 
innovations and the habituation of the moral 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation 
to emulate the rich sits in a bigger picture of his 
theory of moral sentiments, in which the notion 
of the general rules of conduct plays a crucial role 
not only in guiding human behavior but also in 
preserving our society.  Therefore, our account of 
his theory of emulation needs to be supplemented 
by a note on his emphasis on such rules.  On the 
origin and use of the general rules of morality, 
Smith writes:
So par tial are the views of mankind with 
regard to the propriety of their own conduct, 
both at the time of action and after it; and so 
difficult is it for them to view it in the light in 
which any indifferent spectator would consider 
it.  But if it was by a peculiar faculty, such as 
the moral sense is supposed to be, that they 
judged their own conduct, if they were endued 
with a particular power of perception, which 
distinguished the beauty or deformity of 
passions and affections; as their own passions 
would be more immediately exposed to the view 
of this faculty, it would judge with more accuracy 
concerning them than concerning those of 
other men, of which it had only a more distant 
prospect. (TMS, p. 223)
Endowed with the moral sense and the power 
of perception, Smith holds, man, by continually 
observing the conduct of others, forms “certain 
general rules concerning what is fit and proper 
either to be done or to be avoided” (TMS, p. 224). 
His view on this matter is firm:
It is thus that the general rules of morality 
are formed.  They are ultimately founded upon 
experience of what, in particular instances, our 
moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and 
propriety, approve or disapprove of.  We do 
not originally approve or condemn particular 
actions, because, upon examination, they appear 
to be agreeable or consistent with a cer tain 
general rule.  The general rule, on the contrary, 
is formed by finding from experience that all 
actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a 
certain manner, are approved or disapproved of. 
. . . (TMS, pp. 224–25)
The regard for the general rules of morality is a 
sense of duty, which, Smith says, is “a principle 
of the greatest consequence in human life, and 
the only principle by which the bulk of mankind 
are capable of directing their actions” (TMS, p. 
229), and which separates “a man of principle and 
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honour“ from “a worthless fellow” (TMS, p. 231).
In fact, in Smith’s mind the very existence of 
human society hinges on the  the observance of 
the general rules of morality.  Smith says, with full 
respect for such rules:
But if without regard to these general rules, 
even the duties of politeness, which are so 
easily observed, and which one can scarce have 
any serious motive to violate, would yet be so 
frequently violated, what would become of the 
duties of justice, of truth, of chastity, of fidelity, 
which is often dif ficult to observe, and which 
there may be so many strong motives to violate? 
But upon the tolerable obser vance of these 
duties depends the very existence of human 
society, which would crumble into nothing if 
mankind were not generally impressed with a 
reverence for those important rules of conduct. 
(TMS, pp. 241–32)
Furthermore, Smith says that the emergence 
of  the general  r ules of  moral i ty  precedes 
philosophical reasoning, and that they are beyond 
philosophical researches, which are slow and 
uncertain.
 
. . . And thus religion, even in its rudest form, 
gave sanction to the general rules of morality, 
long before the age of artificial reasoning and 
philosophy.  That the terrors of religion should 
thus enforce the natural sense of duty, was 
of too much importance to the happiness of 
mankind, for nature to leave it dependent upon 
the slowness and uncertainty of philosophical 
researches. (TMS, pp. 233)
This point is more elaborately developed by 
Hayek in his thesis on the role of the abstract 
rules of conduct in the extended order; we shall 
take up this point shortly afterward. And, while 
success in business, wealth and honors are the 
recompense “for  encouraging industry, prudence 
and circumspection”, the proper recompense 
“for promoting the practice of truth, justice and 
humanity“ is “confidence, the esteem, and love of 
those we live with” (TMS, p. 236)  Smith says:
. . . Humanity does not desire to be great, but 
to be loved.  It is not in being rich that truth and 
justice would rejoice, but in being trusted and 
believed, recompenses which those virtues must 
almost always acquire.  . . . (TMS, p. 236)
But, ver y impor tantly, Smith says that the 
observance of the general rules of morality are 
suppor ted by “the strongest motives of self-
interest.”  Smith’s notion of self-interest is both 
self-regarding and other-regarding; one without 
the other is destructive of their foundation.  In this 
regard, take a look at the following passage:
How vain, how absurd would it be for man, 
either to oppose or to neglect the commands 
that were laid upon him by infinite wisdom and 
infinite power!  How unnatural, how impiously 
ungrateful not to reverence the precepts that 
were prescribed to him by the infinite goodness 
of his Creator, even though no punishment was 
to follow their violation! The sense of propriety, 
too, is here well supported by the strongest 
motives of self-interest.  . . . (TMS, p. 241)
Thus, for Adam Smith, while the instinct 
of workmanship and the moral sentiments of 
approbation and disapprobation brings about 
an extended order of our economy, our moral 
faculties (our innate sense of merit and demerit of 
our conduct) and our sense of duty to observe the 
general rules of morality are what preserves this 
extended order.  
Before leaving Adam Smith, it is worth adding 
that Hayek, in the epilogue to Law, Legislation 
and Liberty mentions the three sources of human 
values: natural values (innate values that are 
genetically determined), artificial values (those 
that are designed by rational thought), and cultural 
or traditional values (those abstract rules of 
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conduct that have come out through the process 
of cultural evolution). He places the cultural and 
traditional values between instinct and reason as a 
separate category, calling our attention to the fact 
that the evolution of  an extended order is neither 
made possible by instinct nor created by the power 
of reason.  This idea is fully developed in his thesis, 
Fatal Conceit (1988).  There, Hayek calls “the idea 
that the ability to acquire skills stems from reason” 
the “fatal conceit.”  He claims that it is the other 
way around: “our reason is as much the result of an 
evolutionary selection process as is our morality,” 
and that “one should never suppose that our reason 
is in the higher critical position and that only those 
moral rules are valid that reason endorses” (Fatal 
Concept, p. 21).  Hayes writes:
. . .  Lear ning how to behave is more the 
source than the result of insight, reason, and 
understanding. Man is not born wise, rational 
and good, but has to be taught to become so. 
It is not our intellect that created our morals; 
rather, human interactions governed by our 
morals make possible the growth of reason 
and those capabilities associated with it.  Man 
became intelligent because there was tradition—
that which lies between instinct and reason—for 
him to learn.  This tradition, in turn, originated 
not from a capacity rationally to interpret 
observed facts but from habits of responding.  It 
told man primarily what he ought or ought not 
to do under certain conditions rather than what 
he must expect to happen. (Fatal Concept, pp. 
21–22)
And, according to Hayek, it is by following 
abstract rules of conduct that we acquire through 
learning that our great civilization has been made 
possible.  This thesis of Hayek is well known, but 
it reconfirms Adam Smith’s notion that it is the 
general rules of morality that keep our society 
from crumbling into nothing.  Hayek’s words are 
precise to the point:
. . . What are chiefly responsible for having 
generated this extra-ordinary order, and the 
existence of mankind in its present size and 
structure, are the rules of human conduct that 
gradually evolved (especially those dealing with 
several property, honesty, contract, exchange, 
trade, competition, gain, and privacy).  These 
rules are handed on by tradition, teaching and 
imitation, rather than by instinct, and largely 
consist of prohibitions (’shalt not’s’) that 
designate adjustable domains for individual 
decisions.  Mankind achieved civilization by 
developing and learning to follow rules (first 
in territorial tribes and then over broader 
reaches) that often forbade him to do what his 
instincts demanded, and no longer depended 
on a common perception of events.  These 
rules, in effect constituting a new and different 
morality, and to which I would indeed prefer to 
confine the term ’morality’, suppress or restrain 
the ’natural morality’, i.e., those instincts that 
welded together the small group and secured 
cooperation within it at the cost of hindering or 
blocking its expansion. (Fatal Conceit, p. 12) 
6.  Bourdieu’s logic of practice and habitus
In Logic of Practice (1990), Bourdieu proposes a 
theory of practice as practice, which has its position 
between two polar opposites: objective idealism 
(or what may be called positivist materialism) on 
the one pole, which essentially views the social 
relationships as objective relationships that can be 
obtained and ordered in the form of knowledge 
of the objective structure, and subjectivism, on 
the other pole, which consists in abstaining from 
any account of the social world from the viewpoint 
of objective necessity.  Bourdieu insists that the 
objects of knowledge are not passively recorded 
but rather actively constructed under the principle 
of construction he named the habitus, which is a 
durable system of structured as well as structuring 
dispositions (LP, p. 52).  Bourdieu writes:
. . . The theory of practice as practice insists, 
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contrary to positivist materialism, that the objects
of knowledge are constructed, not passively 
recorded, and, contrary to intellectualist ideal-
ism, that the principle of this construction is the 
system of structured, structuring dispositions, 
the habitus, which is constituted in practice and 
is always oriented towards practical functions. 
(LP, p. 52)
According to Bourdieu, building a theory of 
practice calls for returning to the very site where 
the dialectic of practice, “the dialectic of the opus 
operatum and the modus operandi”, takes place, 
falling neither into objectivism which necessarily 
leads to the realism of the social structure nor 
into the subjectivism which cannot address the 
necessity of this structure at all (LP, p. 52).  With 
this preliminary, Bourdieu defines this site, that 
is, habitus, as systems of durable and transposable 
dispositions that function as structuring structures 
for practices as well as for representations.
 
The conditionings associated with a particular 
class of conditions of existence produce habitus, 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function 
as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and 
representations that can be objectively adapted 
to their  outcomes without presupposing 
a conscious aiming at ends or an express 
mastery of the operations necessary in order 
to attain them.  Objectively, ‘regulated’ and 
‘regular’ without being in any way the product 
of obedience to rules, they can be collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the 
organizing action of a conductor.  (LP, p. 53)
If habitus is a system of durable and transposable 
dispositions produced by the conditions of 
existence themselves, Bourdieu says there should 
be no such things as stimuli for practice in the 
objective sense, because stimuli act on agents only 
if agents are preconditioned to recognize them 
as such (LP, p. 53).  For him, the world in which 
practices take place is already the world of a pre-
realized or pre-conditioned ends and means.
. . . the practical world that is constituted in the 
relationship with the habitus acting as a system 
of cognitive and motivating structures, is a 
world of already realized ends—procedures to 
follow, paths to take—and of objects endowed 
with a ‘permanent teleological character,’ in 
Husserl’s phrase, tools and institutions.  This is 
because the regularities inherent in an arbitrary 
condition (‘arbitrary’ in Saussure’s and Mauss’s 
sense) tend to appear as necessary, even natural, 
since they are the basis of the schemes of 
perception and appreciation through which they 
are apprehended. (LP, pp. 53–54)
So it is natural for Bourdieu that the habitus, “the 
dispositions durably inculcated by the probabilities 
and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, 
opportunities and prohibitions inscribed in the 
objective conditions . . . generate dispositions 
objectively compatible with these conditions and 
in a sense pre-adapted to their demands” (LP, p. 
54).  This is how the habitus becomes a virtue 
created of necessity (the conditions of existence), 
a virtue “to refuse what is anyway denied and to 
will the inevitable” (LP, p. 54).  Thus, the habitus 
“ensures the active presence of past experiences, 
which, deposited in each organism in the form of 
schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to 
guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their 
constancy over time, more reliably than all formal 
rules and explicit norms” (LP, p. 54).  It connects 
the internal with the external (or internalizes the 
external) and becomes the source of the principle 
of the continuity and regularity in the social world.
. . . This system of dispositions—a present past 
that tends to perpetuate itself into the future by 
reactivation in similarly structured practices, an 
internal law through which the law of external 
necessities, irreducible to immediate constraints, 
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is constantly exerted—is the principle of the 
continuity and regularity which objectivism sees 
in social practices without being able to account 
for it; and also of the regulated transformations 
that cannot be explained either by the extrinsic, 
instantaneous determinisms of mechanistic 
sociologism or by the purely internal but equally 
instantaneous determination of spontaneist 
subjectivism.  Overriding the spurious oppo-
sition between the forces inscribed in an earlier 
state of the system, outside the body, and 
the internal forces arising instantaneously as 
motivations springing from free will, the internal 
dispositions—the internalization of externality—
enable the external forces to exert themselves, 
but in accordance with the specific logic of the 
organisms in which they are incorporated, i.e, in 
a durable, systematic and non-mechanical way. 
(LP, pp. 54–55)
Claiming that the external forces are internalized 
into the dispositions, Bourdieu is critical of the 
dichotomy on which the neoclassical economics 
is based, namely, the separation between external 
constraining conditions and the preferences that 
are internally born.  In his view, which is focused 
on the internalization of the external constraints 
into preferences that end up willing the inevitable, 
this dichotomy makes no sense.  For him, the 
regularity and the continuity of human behavior 
must find its source ultimately in the habitus-
dispositions.
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is not limited to the 
logic of practice on the plane of everyday choices. 
It is also thought to be the generative source of “all 
the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in 
the particular conditions of its production” (LP, p. 
55).  But, he insists that the power of this source is 
contained by “the historically and socially situated 
conditions of its production” (LP. p. 55).  Bourdieu 
states:
. . . Because the habitus is an infinite capacity 
for generating products—thoughts, perceptions, 
expressions and actions—whose limits are 
set by the historically and socially situated 
conditions of its production, the conditioned 
and conditional freedom it provides is as remote 
from creation of unpredictable novelty as it is 
from simple mechanical reproduction of the 
original conditioning. (LP, p. 55)
. . . In short, being the product of a particular 
class of objective regularities, the habitus tends 
to generate all the ‘reasonable’, ‘common-
sense,’ behaviors (and only these) which are 
possible within the limits of these regularities, 
and which are likely to be positively sanctioned 
because they are objectively adjusted to the 
logic characteristic of a particular field, whose 
objective future they anticipate.  At the same 
time, ‘without violence, ar t or argument’, it 
tends to exclude all ‘extravagances’ (‘not for 
the likes of us’), that is, all the behaviors that 
would be negatively sanctioned because they are 
incompatible with the objective conditions. (LP, 
pp. 55–56)
For Bourdieu, the habitus is an embodied, 
internalized, but forgotten history of past practices, 
a spontaneity in the unconscious, which forgets 
history while its objective structures leave their 
imprints in the quasi-natures of habitus (LP, p. 56). 
According to him, “the habitus is a spontaneity 
without consciousness or will, opposed as much to 
the mechanical necessity of things without history 
in mechanistic theories as it is to the reflexive 
freedom of subjects ‘without inertia’ in rationalist 
theories.” (LP, p. 56).  Bourdieu states in strong 
terms:  
Thus the dualistic vision that recognizes only 
the self-transparent act of consciousness or 
the externally determined thing has to give to 
the real logic of action, which brings together 
two objectifications of history, objectification 
in bodies and objectification in institutions 
or, which amounts to the same things, two 
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states of capital, objectified and incorporated, 
through which a distance is set up from ne-
cessity and its urgencies.  This logic is seen 
in paradigmatic  for m in the dialect ic  of 
expressive dispositions and instituted means 
of expression (morphological, syntactic and 
lexical instruments, literary genres, etc.) which 
is obser ved in the intentionless investion of 
regulated improvisation.  (LP, pp. 56–57)
And, Bourdieu insists that, “the habitus is what 
enables the institution to attain full realization” (LP, 
p. 57), saying that “an institution, even an economy, 
is complete and fully viable only if it is durably 
objectified not only in things, that is, in the logic, 
transcending individual agents, of a par ticular 
field, but also in bodies, in durable dispositions to 
recognize and comply with the demands immanent 
in the field” (LP, p. 58).  This notion of habitus is in 
close agreement with Parsons’ position mentioned 
in section 2 that for socialization the crucial 
characteristics or cultural symbolism of society 
need be internalized into the personality structure 
on an all inclusive scale integrating an affective 
organization of emotional attachments and proper 
attitudes acquired by way of the common culture 
that includes cognitive reference system (the 
system of cognitive categorizations of the world), 
the system of expressive symbolism, and the 
system of moral standards (1952, p. 27–30).  
The habitus also produces a common-sense 
world through formation of consensus on the 
meaning of practices and the world (LP, p. 58), 
and practices within the habitus are objectively 
harmonized and mutually adjusted without 
any conscious reference to a norm or explicit 
coordination.  He says:
The objective homogenizing of group or class 
habitus that results from homogeneity of 
conditions of existence is what enables practices 
to be objectively harmonized without any 
calculation or conscious reference to a norm and 
mutually adjusted in the absence of any direct 
interaction or, a fortiori, explicit co-ordination. 
. . . So long as one ignores the true principle 
of the conductorless orchestration which gives 
regularity, unity and systematicity to practices 
even in the absence of any spontaneous or 
imposed organization of individual projects, 
one is condemned to the naive artificialism that 
recognizes no other unifying principle than 
conscious co-ordination.  (LP, pp. 58–59)
On collective action, Bourdieu cautions that it is 
“extremely dangerous to conceive collective action 
by analogy with individual action, ignoring all that 
the former owes to the relatively autonomous logic 
of the institutions of mobilization (with their own 
history, their specific organization, etc.) and to 
the situations, institutionalized or not, in which it 
occurs” (LP, p. 59).  Then Boudieu dicusses the 
relationship between class habitus and individual 
habitus by distinguishing the non-individualized 
(identical, impersonal, and interchangeable) 
part of internalized subjective structures from 
the singularity of the trajectories of individual 
dispositions, and characterizes this relationship as 
one of homology (diversity within homogeneity) 
in which the systems of dispositions of individuals 
who belong to the same class are viewed as 
str uctural variants to one another.  On this 
important point, he states:
. . . class (or group) habitus, . . . , could be 
regarded as a subjective but non-individual 
system of internalized structures, common 
schemes of perception, conception and action, 
which are the precondition of all objectification 
and apperception; and the objective co-ordination 
of practices and the sharing of a world-view 
could be founded on the perfect impersonality 
and interchangeability of singular practices and 
views.  But this would amount to regarding all 
the practices or representations produced in 
accordance with identical schemes as impersonal 
and interchangeable, like individual intuitions of 
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space which, according to Kant, reflect none of 
the particularities of the empirical ego.  In fact, 
the singular habitus of members of the same 
class are united in a relationship of homology, 
that is, of diversity within homogeneity reflecting 
the diversity within homogeneity characteristic 
of their social conditions of production.  Each 
individual system of dispositions is a structural 
variant of the others, expressing the singularity 
of its position within the class and its trajectory. 
(LP, p. 60)   
An important question arises here:  If the systems 
of dispositions of individuals who are placed in 
similar conditions of existence are homologous, 
and if the society is divided into dif ferentiated 
classes with corresponding life-styles, what would 
be the relationship among these classes, each with 
homologous dispositions?
Individual dispositions owe their singularity to 
the sequence of irreducible past experiences (LP, 
p. 60).  And, the dialectic of the habitus is between 
the constancy and stability that it unconsciously 
seeks and new contingently occurring experiences 
with new information that may threaten its defense 
against crises.  Nonetheless, this dialectic is 
dominated by earlier and accumulated experiences 
through the defense mechanism of rejecting 
information that threatens the stability of the 
habitus and avoiding exposure to such information, 
although it must be admitted that it is paradoxical 
that the habitus needs information to tell which 
information is to be avoided for its stability.  If 
the class distinctions or the life-styles of different 
classes are defined by privation relative to what 
other classes have, it inevitably follows that the 
habitus belonging to a given class must be aware 
of what it does not have, hence of the information 
that threatens its constancy.  As Bourdieu focuses 
on the self-fulfilling nature of the habitus, the 
problem of this paradox about the unchosen 
principle of all choices is solved by saying that the 
avoidance strategies or, more fundamentally, the 
underlying schemes of perception are an unwilling 
non-conscious product borne by the conditions 
of existence.  In comparison, in Veblen and Adam 
Smith, class divisions and class consciousness, 
which are a product of cultural evolution, are the 
conditions of invidious comparison, whether for 
the purpose of winning the applaud of others or 
for the purpose of emulating higher classes under 
the canon of conspicuous waste.  In this respect, 
Bourdieu’s theory of habitus can be viewed as the 
closing principle that generates classes and their 
symbolic distinctions, not as the opening principle 
that extends the socio-economic order through 
innovative activities of mankind.  At any rate, 
Bourdieu says:
The habitus which, at every moment, structures 
new experiences in accordance with the 
str uctures produced by past experiences, 
which are modified by the new experiences 
within the limits defined by their power of 
selection, brings about a unique integration, 
dominated by the earliest experiences, of the 
experiences statistically common to members 
of the same class.  Early experiences have 
par ticular weight because the habitus tends 
to ensure its own constancy and its defence 
against change through the selection it makes 
within new information by rejecting information 
capable of calling into question its accumulated 
information, if exposed to it accidentally or by 
force, and especially by avoiding exposure to 
such information . . .  Through the systematic 
‘choices’ it makes among the places, events and 
people that might be frequented, the habitus 
tends to protect itself from crises and critical 
challenges by providing itself with a milieu to 
which it is as pre-adapted as possible, that is, a 
relatively constant universe of situations tending 
to reinforce its dispositions by of fering the 
market most favourable to its products.  And 
once again it is the most paradoxical property 
of the habitus, the unchosen principle of all 
‘choices’, that yields the solution to the paradox 
of the information needed in order to avoid 
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information.  The schemes of perception and 
appreciation of the habitus which are the basis 
of all the avoidance strategies are largely the 
product of a non-conscious, unwilled avoidance, 
whether it results automatically from the 
conditions of existence (for example, spatial 
segregation) or has been produced by a strategic 
intention (such as avoidance of ‘bad company’ 
or ‘unsuitable books’) originating from adults 
themselves formed in the same conditions. (LP, 
pp. 60–61)
The self-fulfilling nature of habitus is emphasized 
still more by denying that the strategies of agents 
endowed with a habitus are oriented to their 
own consequences because they are themselves 
“determined by the past conditions of production of 
their principle of production, that is, by the already 
realized outcome of identical or interchangeable 
past practices, which coincides with their own 
outcome only to the extent that the structures 
within which they function are identical to or 
homologous with the objective structures of which 
they are the product” (LP, p. 61).  He is, therefore, 
critical of the teleological description of rational 
agents interacting under perfect information of 
each other’s preferences and competencies and 
of any description of the reactions of interacting 
agents as mechanistic responses (LP, p. 61). 
According to him, the objectively organized 
strategies or practices that one employs are not 
the product of genuine strategic intention that 
scans the space of all possible moves; they are 
rather the product of the habitus, a par ticular 
durable relationship among the possible between 
dispositions and the objective conditions.  The fact 
that such strategies have the appearance of being 
determined by anticipation of their consequences 
owes decisively to the fact that they are part of 
the practices that are preadapted to the objective 
conditions in which they are used so that the past 
is always present in them.  When this adaption 
is perfect, it gives “the most complete illusion of 
finality,” or “self-regulating mechanism” (LP, p. 62).
. . . the dispositions durably inculcated by the 
objective conditions and by a pedagogic action 
that is tendentially adjusted to these conditions, 
tend to generate practices objectively compatible 
with these conditions and expectations pre-
adapted to their objective demands . . .  As a 
consequence, they tend, without any rational 
calculation or conscious estimation of the 
chances of success, to ensure immediate 
correspondence between the a priori or ex ante 
probability conferred on an event (whether or 
not accompanied by subjective experiences 
such as hopes, expectation, fears, etc.) and the 
a posteriori or ex post probability that can be 
established on the basis of past experience. 
They thus make it possible to understand why 
economic models based on the (tacit) premise 
of a ‘relationship of intelligible causality’, as 
Max Weber (1922) calls it, between generic 
(‘typical’) chances ‘objectively existing as an 
average’ and ‘subjective expectations,’ or, for 
example, between investment or the propensity 
to invest and the rate of return expected or really 
obtained in the past, fairly exactly account for 
practices which do not arise from knowledge of 
the objective chances. (LP, p. 63)
Bourdieu relates the pract ices bor ne of 
habitus to Max Weber’s distinction between a 
pure model of rational action under complete 
knowledge of circumstances and intentions and 
an anthropological description of practices (1922, 
1968) for the reason that practices depend on 
specific chances that are appropriated by capital 
that an actor possesses.
By pointing out that rational action, ‘judiciously’ 
oriented according to what is ‘objectively valid’ 
(1922), is what ‘would have happened if the actors 
had had knowledge of all the circumstances and 
all the participants’ intentions’ (1968: 6), that is of 
what is valid in the eyes of the scientist’, who alone 
is able to calculate the system of objective chances 
to which perfectly informed action would have to 
be adjusted, Weber shows clearly that the pure 
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model of rational action cannot be regarded as an 
anthropological description of practice.  This is not 
only because real agents only very exceptionally 
possess the complete information, and the skill to 
appreciate it, that rational action would presuppose. 
Apart from rare cases which bring together the 
economic and cultural conditions for rational action 
oriented by knowledge of the profits that can be 
obtained in the different markets, practices depend 
not on the average chances of profit, an abstract 
and unreal notion, but on the specific chances that 
a singular agent or class of agents possesses by 
virtue of its capital, this being understood, in this 
respect, as a means of appropriation of the chances 
theoretically available to all (LP, p. 63).
Bourdieu is critical of economic theory which 
“acknowledges only the rational ‘responses’ of an 
indeterminate, interchangeable agent to ‘potential 
oppor tunities’, or more precisely to average 
chances,” because it “converts the immanent law 
of the economy into a universal norm of proper 
economic behavior” (LP, p. 63).  He emphasizes 
that the rational habitus or rational dispositions 
themselves can only be acquired under certain 
social conditions as the product of par ticular 
economic condition defined by economic and 
cultural capital.  We note in passing that this 
account of the habitus-bound rational practices 
resonates with Hayek’s point on the use of 
knowledge in society (Hayek 1945).  The economic 
order is not a product of universally valid rational 
responses, but rather a product of the chances that 
are appropriated by economic and cultural capital 
acquired under social conditions.  He says:
  
. . . In so doing, it conceals the fact that the 
’rational’ habitus which is the precondition for 
appropriate economic behavior is the product of 
particular economic condition, the one defined 
by possession of the economic and cultural 
capital required in order to seize the ‘potential 
opportunities’ theoretically available to all; and 
also that the same dispositions, by adapting 
the economically most deprived to the specific 
condition of which they are the product and 
thereby helping to make their adaptation to the 
generic demands of the economic cosmos (as 
regards calculation, forecasting, etc.) lead them 
to accept the negative sanctions resulting from 
this lack of adaptation, that is, their deprivation. 
In shor t, the ar t of estimating and seizing 
chances, the capacity to anticipate the future 
by a kind of practical induction or even to take 
a calculated gamble on the possible against 
the probable, are dispositions that can only be 
acquired in certain social conditions, that is, 
certain social conditions. (LP, pp. 63–64)
Furthermore, on the pre-emptive rights on the 
future, Bourdieu holds that such rights cannot be 
appropriated without the projection of the power 
relations that are present; according to him, they 
are “the explicitly guaranteed form of the whole 
set of appropriated chances through which the 
power relations of the present project themselves 
into the future, from where they govern present 
dispositions, especially those towards the future” 
(LP, p. 64).  What he sees is the relationship 
between the habitus and a state of the chances 
offered in the social world, which is dictated by 
a relation to power. In this sense, habitus is ‘the 
principle of a selective perception of the indices’ 
for confirmation and reinforcement of itself; it 
makes itself an accomplice by reading in the future 
what is probable in its social space and thereby 
brings about what it can effectively anticipate (LP, 
pp. 64−65).  In Bourdieu’s view, the habitus is not 
a creative principle that transforms itself by going 
beyond the probable since it is already restrained 
by its social conditions.  This is what he says on 
this self-fulling nature of the habitus.
. . . In fact, a given agent’s practical relation to 
the future, which governs his present practice, is 
defined in the relationship between, on the one 
hand, his habitus with its temporal structures 
and dispositions towards the future, constituted 
in the course of a par ticular relationship to 
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a particular universe of probabilities, and on 
the other hand a certain state of the chances 
objectively offered to him by the social world. 
The relation to what is possible is a relation to 
power; and the sense of the probable future is 
constituted in the prolonged relationship with 
a world structured according to the categories 
of the possible (for us) and the impossible (for 
us), of what is appropriated in advance by and 
for others and what one can reasonably expect 
for oneself.  The habitus is the principle of a 
selective perception of the indices tending to 
confirm and reinforce it rather than transform 
it, a matrix generating responses adapted in 
advance to all objective conditions identical to 
or homologous with the (past) conditions of its 
production; it adjusts itself to a probable future 
which it anticipates and helps to bring about 
because it reads it directly in the basis of what 
Marx (1975: 378) calls ‘ef fective demand’ (as 
opposed to ‘demand without effect’, based on 
need and desire), a realistic relation to what is 
possible, founded on and therefore limited by 
power.  This disposition, always marked by its 
(social) conditions of acquisition and realization, 
tends to adjust to the objective chances of 
satisfying need or desire, inclining agents to 
‘cut their coats according to their cloth’, and 
so to become the accomplices of the processes 
that tend to make the probable a reality. (LP, pp. 
64–65)
7.   Bourdieu’s theory of distinction and life-
styles
In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu turns to the 
implications of the logic of practice for distinction 
and life-styles.  He opens his discussion by 
first af firming the legitimacy of an institutional 
approach to sociological investigations of the social 
space, that is, by asserting that the question of 
what the social space is should be raised within 
this space itself.  He then takes the position that 
the social space is structured by a generative 
principle called the habitus, whose systematicity 
and transportability is assured by the fact that it is 
both a structuring structure (modus operandi) and 
a structured structure (opus operatum), and that 
the internalization of the habitus in the mind of 
agents becomes the source of life-styles supported 
by a distribution of symbolic capital and power 
in the social space.  Thus, Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus contains, in a complementary manner, both 
the meaning-giving acts of agents living in it and a 
coherent complex of the products of such acts.  In 
the language of Bourdieu’s theory, Veblen’s instinct 
of workmanship (his primary generative principle) 
and the habituated tastes for invidious pecuniary 
comparison (his selective principle that has 
resulted from the instinct of workmanship through 
a long histor y of habituation and evolution) 
can be thought of as being, simultaneously, 
a structuring structure (that carries within it 
the symbolic products that meet the tastes for 
invidious comparison in pecuniary terms) and a 
structured structure.  Likewise, Adam Smith’s 
notion of the moral sentiments for approbation and 
disapprobation can be thought of as a structuring 
structure, and the space of those dif ferentiated 
articles, both of ordinary usage and of those of 
elegant contrivances, that satisfy our quest for 
approbation, can be thought of as a structured 
structure.  Adam Smith’s human folly of toiling 
for more wealth and better contrivances resonates 
with Bourdieu’s notion that the experiences in the 
social world belong to a misrecognized order of 
this world.
First we confirm that Bourdieu defines habitus 
as a generative principle with dual roles.  This is 
what he has to say on this principle in Distinction.
. . . The habitus is both the generative principle 
of objectively classifiable judgements and the 
system of classification (principium divisionis) of 
these practices.  It is in the relationship between 
the two capacities which define the habitus, 
the capacity to produce classifiable practices 
and works, and the capacity to differentiate and 
appreciate these practices and products (taste), 
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that the represented social world, i.e., the space 
of life-styles, is constituted.
The relationship that is actually established 
between the permanent characteristics of 
economic and social condition (capital volume 
and composition, in both synchronic and 
diachronic aspects) and the distinctive features 
associated with the corresponding position 
in the universe of life-styles only becomes 
intelligible when the habitus is constructed as 
the generative formula which makes it possible 
to account both for the classifiable practices and 
products and for the judgements, themselves 
classified, which make these practices and 
works into a system of distinctive signs.  . . . The 
habitus is necessity internalized and converted 
into a disposition that generates meaningful 
practices and meaning-giving perceptions; it is a 
general, transposable disposition which carries 
out a systematic, universal application—beyond 
the limits of what has been directly learned—of 
the necessity inherent in the learning conditions. 
(D, p. 170)
The habitus is not only a structuring structure, 
which organizes practices and the perception 
of practices, but also a structured structure: 
the principle of division into logical classes 
which organizes the perception of the social 
world is itself the product of internalization of 
the division into social classes. . . The most 
fundamental oppositions in the structure (high/
low, rich/poor etc.) tend to establish themselves 
as the fundamental structuring principles of 
practices and the perception of practices.  As a 
system of practice-generating schemes which 
expresses systematically the necessity and 
freedom inherent in its class condition and the 
difference constituting that position, the habitus 
apprehends dif ferences between conditions, 
which it grasps in the form of dif ferences 
between classif ied,  classifying practices 
(products of other habitus), in accordance 
with principles of dif ferentiation which, being 
themselves the product of these differences, are 
objectively attuned to them and therefore tend to 
perceive them as natural.  (D, pp. 171–172)
  
The habitus, both as a structuring structure 
(modus operandi) and as a structured structure 
(opus operatum), then becomes the source of 
life-styles for agents therein, by engendering 
systematic configurations of properties that are 
differentiated by differential deviations.
. . . the practices engendered by the dif ferent 
habitus appear as systematic configurations of 
properties expressing dif ferences objectively 
inscribed in conditions of existence in the form 
of systems of differential deviations which, when 
perceived by agents endowed with the schemes 
of perception and appreciation necessar y in 
order to identify, interpret and evaluate their 
pertinent features, function as life-styles. (D, p. 
170)
But, the life-styles as the products of the habitus, 
are recognition of an order in the mind; they are, 
therefore, socially qualified sign systems, not an 
objective truth.  This is an important point as it 
rejects any notion of the spontaneous generation 
of class consciousness.  For Bourdieu, the dialectic 
between the conditions of existence and habitus 
takes place through life-styles and a distribution 
of symbolic capital in the plane of perceived 
dif ferences established in the mind of agents, 
while the practices and products of agents of the 
same class preserve the objectivity of the habitus 
without any conscious effort at orchestration (D, 
pp. 172–173).  Bourdieu writes:
. . . The dialectic of conditions and habitus 
is the basis of an alchemy which transforms 
the distribution of capital, the balance-sheet 
of a power relation, into a system of perceived 
dif ferences, distinctive properties, that is, a 
distribution of symbolic capital, legitimate 
capital, whose objective truth is misrecognized. 
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(D, p. 172)
If the mind of agents is structured by the 
structuring structure of the habitus and if life-styles 
are the products structured by the habitus, what 
preserves the two in their structuring-structured 
relationships, or what mediates such relationships 
is the tastes for life-styles.  Bourdieu explains how 
taste serves as the generative formula of life-style 
and why taste is so pervasive in the social space. 
He elaborates on this point as follows:
Systematicity is found in the opus operatum 
because it is in the modus operandi.  It is found 
in all the properties—and property—with which 
individuals and groups surround themselves, 
houses, furniture, paintings, books, cars, spirits, 
cigarettes, perfume, clothes, and in the practices 
in which they manifest their distinction, sports, 
games, entertainments, only because it is in 
the synthetic unity of the habitus, the unifying, 
generative principle of all practices.  Taste, 
the propensity and capacity to appropriate 
(materially or symbolically) a given class of 
classified, classifying objects or practices, is the 
generative formula of life-style, a unitary set of 
distinctive preferences which express the same 
expressive intention in the specific logic of each 
of the symbolic sub-spaces, furniture, clothing, 
language or body hexis.  Each dimension 
of life-style ‘symbolizes with’ the others, in 
Leibniz’s phrase, and symbolizes them.  An 
old cabinetmaker’s world view, the way he 
manages his budget, his time or his body, his 
use of language and choice of clothing are fully 
present in his ethic of scrupulous, impeccable 
craftsmanship and in the aesthetic of work for 
work’s sake which leads him to measure the 
beauty of his products by the care and patience 
that have gone into them.  (D, pp. 173–174)
For Bourdieu, taste is also an operator of 
mapping from the universe of objects more or 
less continuously distributed to the universe 
of symbolic expressions of life-style, from an 
order of physical bodies to an order of symbolic 
distinctions.  Taste in this sense reflects the 
opus operatum of the habitus.  It is, moreover, 
an operator of mapping from the universe of 
objectively classified practices into the universe of 
classifying practices of symbolic expression.  Taste 
in the latter sense mediates the modus operandi 
of the habitus as a systematic expression of the 
condition of existence which constitutes a life-style. 
He says: 
Taste is the practical operator of the trans-
mutation of things into distinct and distinctive 
s igns ,  o f  cont inuous  d is t r ibut ions  in to 
discont inuous opposit ions;  i t  ra ises the 
dif ferences inscribed in the physical order 
of bodies to the symbolic order of significant 
distinctions. It transforms objectively classified 
practices, in which a class condition signifies 
itself (through taste), into classifying practices, 
that is, into a symbolic expression of class 
position, by perceiving them in their mutual 
relations and in terms of social classificatory 
schemes.  Taste is thus the source of the 
system of distinctive features which cannot fail 
to be perceived as a systematic expression of a 
particular class of conditions of existence, i.e., as 
a distinctive life-style, by anyone who possesses 
practical  knowledge of the relationships 
between distinctive signs and positions in the 
distribution–between the universe of objective 
properties, which is brought to light by scientific 
construction, and the no less objective universe 
of life-styles, which exists as such for and 
through ordinary experience.  (D, pp. 174–175)
Bourdieu then holds that this system of a life-
style, the product of internalization of the structure 
of social space, is the transformer of the necessity 
into the virtue of making appropriate choices that 
constitute it.  For Bourdieu, therefore, preferences 
of an agent do not exist independently of the 
conditions of his or her existence.  Choices and the 
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regularities within the limits of economic feasibility 
are transformed into self-fulfilling preferences. 
This view of the non-mechanical relationship 
between the necessity and the virtue of the choices 
induced is central to his position that the social 
space is reproduced from within itself through the 
medium of life-styles and tastes.  On this important 
point, he writes:
This classificatory system, which is the product 
of internalization of the structure of social space, 
in the form in which it impinges through the 
experience of a particular position in that space, 
is, within the limits of economic possibilities and 
impossibilities (which it tends to reproduce in its 
own logic), the generator of practices adjusted 
to the regularities inherent in a condition.  It 
continuously transforms necessities into 
strategies, constraints into preferences, and, 
without any mechanical determination, it 
generates the set of ‘choices’ constituting 
life-styles, which derive their meaning, i.e., 
their value, from their position in a system of 
oppositions and correlations.  It is a virtue made 
of necessity which continuously transforms 
necessity into virtue by inducing ‘choices’ which 
correspond to the condition of which it is the 
product.  As can be seen whenever a change 
in social position puts the habitus into new 
conditions, so that its specific efficacy can be 
isolated, it is taste—the taste of necessity or the 
taste of luxury—and not high or low income 
which commands the practices objectively 
adjusted to these resources.  Through taste, an 
agent has what he likes because he likes what 
he has, that is, the properties actually given him 
in the distributions and legitimately assigned to 
him in the classifications.  (D, p. 175)
Bourdieu also claims that the generative 
schemes of the habitus applies universally across 
all dissimilar practices and goods of dif ferent 
classes, because the principles of oppositions 
and correlations constituting different systems of 
life-styles are homologous to one another.  The 
extensiveness of this homology derives from the 
fact that such systems are homologous to “the 
structure of objective oppositions between class 
conditions.”  Bourdieu then shows how the two 
principles or axes, economic capital and cultural 
capital, organize the universe of life-styles and 
govern the space of cultural consumption.  That is, 
the dispositions and induced practices of different 
classes are differentiated by the opposition dictated 
by the extent to which economic and cultural 
capital are appropriated; this appropriation ranges 
from that of the rich in both capital to that of the 
poor who lack both.   The rich and the dominant 
develop the tastes of luxury and freedom, while 
the poor and the dominated develop the tastes of 
necessity.  For example, those at the top “demand 
of art a high degree of denial of the social world 
and incline toward a hedonistic aesthetic of ease 
and facility.”  The dominated, on the other hand, 
caught between ambition and restraint, develop 
an aesthetic disposition for self-imposed austerity, 
restraint, reserve, and relaxation in tension, are 
inclined to “welcome a pessimistic representation 
of the social world.”  Such stylization of life 
permeates to all areas of practices, in language 
where the opposition is observed between the 
refined and the outspoken styles of speech, in body 
language where a similar opposition is observed 
between the noble and the fast gestures, and 
in primary tastes where an analogous principle 
shows up again between quantity and quality. 
This two-way organization of the social space by 
the composition of economic and cultural capital 
brings to focus on the differences in tastes of those 
who belong to the same income bracket but differ 
in the cultural capital they possess.  Economic 
variables, therefore, are necessary, because they 
measure the distance from or the proximity to 
the necessity and the degree of freedom from the 
material constraint, but not sufficient to account 
for the human proclivities to look for symbolic 
profits of cultural consumption (D, pp. 175–177). 
Bourdieu writes in forcible terms:
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. . . The true basis of the differences found in 
the area of consumption, and far beyond it, is 
the opposition between the tastes of luxur y 
(or freedom) and the tastes of necessity.  The 
former are the tastes of individuals who are 
the product of material conditions of existence 
defined by distance from necessity, by the 
freedoms of facilities stemming from possession 
of capital; the latter express, precisely in their 
adjustment, the necessities of which they are the 
product.  Thus it is possible to deduce popular 
tastes for the foods that are simultaneously most 
’filing’ and most economical from the necessity 
of reproducing labour power at the lowest cost 
which is forced on the proletariat at its very 
definition.  The idea of taste, typically bourgeois, 
since it presupposes absolute freedom of 
choice, is so closely associated with the idea of 
freedom that most people find it hard to grasp 
the paradoxes of the taste of necessity.  Some 
simply sweep it aside, making practice a direct 
product of economic necessity (workers eat 
beans because they cannot af ford anything 
else), failing to realize that necessity can only be 
fulfilled, most of the time, because the agents 
are inclined to fulfill it, because they have a 
taste for what they are always condemned to. 
. . . Taste is amor fati, the choice of destiny, 
but a forced choice, produced by conditions of 
existence which rule out all alternatives as mere 
daydreams and leave no choice but the taste for 
the necessary.  (D, pp. 177–178) 
And, Bourdieu says that the taste of necessity 
forms the basis of  a  l i fe -style only by the 
relationship of privation vis-à-vis other life styles. 
In this sense, a life-style as a classificatory system 
can be as such only if it is defined by what it lacks, 
not by what it has.
The taste of necessity can only be the basis of a 
life-style ‘in-itself’, which is defined as such only 
negatively, by an absence, by the relationship of 
privation between itself and the other life-styles. 
For some, there are elective emblems, for others 
stigmata which they bear in their very bodies. 
‘As the chosen people bore in their features the 
sign that they were the property of Jehovah, so 
the division of labour brands the manufacturing 
worker as the property of capital.’  The brand 
which Marx speaks of is nothing other than 
life-style, through which the most deprived 
immediately betray themselves, even in their use 
of spare time; in so doing they inevitably serve as 
a foil to every distinction and contribute, purely 
negatively, to the dialectic of pretension and 
distinction which fuels the incessant changing of 
taste. (D, pp. 178–179)
Holding that tastes in food cannot be isolated 
from other dimensions of the relationship to 
the social world (Distinction, p. 193), Bourdieu 
observes that the demonstration of such a point 
requires a systematic comparison of the working-
class and bourgeois ways of serving, presenting, 
of fering food, and eating food, which should 
reveal the enactment of the social world of the two 
classes much more closely than the nature of the 
products served, admitting at the same time that 
it is not easy to make such a comparison because 
each life-style can only be defined by the relation 
of privation vis-à-vis other life-styles (Distinction, 
p. 193).  Nonetheless, Bourdieu gives a detailed 
account of the manners with which food is served 
in the life-styles of the two classes, and highlights 
the antagonistic approaches to practical philosophy 
on the treatment of food and the act of eating 
and ser ving food, i.e, the dif ferences between 
the abundance, the substance, and liber ties 
with emphasis on the immediate satisfactions 
of food and drink and with no strict observance 
of dining rules on the one hand, and the form, 
the restraint, and the censorship on the bodily 
pleasure to aestheticize the material reality of food 
consumption into the art of living on the other (D, 
pp. 195–196, p. 199). 
In the concluding part of Distinction, Bourdieu 
characterizes (1) taste as a cer tain acquired 
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disposition and a practical master y of cer tain 
distributions, (2) the schemes of the habitus as the 
primary source of classificatory schemes working 
below the level of consciousness and language, 
and (3) the social agents as producers of both 
classifiable acts and acts of classification  (D, pp. 
466–467).  And, on the importance of the active 
aspect of social knowledge, Bourdieu reiterates 
that the knowledge of the social world is an act 
of construction through a system of internalized 
embodied schemes or social structures based on 
the principles of division common to all agents, 
and that such divisions are revealed in the network 
of common place oppositions that finds its source 
in the opposition between the dominant and the 
dominated (D, pp. 467–469).
Two principles of opposition inhere in this social 
mythology of the social order, the opposition 
between the dominant and the dominated, 
inscribed in the division of labor, and the opposition 
between two principles of domination in two 
powers. (D, p. 469)  In Bourdieu’s view, the social 
order of the opposition and divisions becomes 
inscribed as principles in people’s minds in 
constituting the image of the social world through 
the differentiated and differentiating conditionings 
that  are associated with the condit ions of 
existence (D, p. 471).   What is important about 
such conditionings is that experiencing objective 
limits gives rise to a sense of limits or exclusion 
in the mind of people from what is beyond their 
appropriation (D. p. 471).
Bourdieu holds that there is a correspondence 
between the real world (social structures of real 
divisions) and the thought world (the mental 
structures of the practical principles of division), 
and, in consequence, the relations of order that 
run through them inseparably are accepted as self-
evident structures of the social world and become 
embodied in people’s schemes of cognition 
(miscognition).  This is the origin of the logical 
conformity (Durkheim 1915).  It is this conformity 
that “makes it possible to act as if one knew the 
structure of the social world, one’s place within it 
and the distances that need to be kept” (D, p. 472).
This logical conformity and the conservation of 
the social order need to be scrutinized carefully in 
the light of the Husserlian distinction between the 
static and genetic phenomenology, particularly with 
respect to whether the social world, constructed 
in the mind of people, is finitely closed or infinitely 
open.  If the construction of the social world is 
a mental phenomenon that fulfills itself through 
a synthesis of single and par ticular forms of 
intentional mental process, it gives rise to a higher 
level consciousness that sees this construction 
just as another construction and leaves a gap to 
be filled by a dynamic or genetic phenomenology 
in which “I” as the subject transcends itself.  To 
place Bourdieu’s static phenomenology of habitus 
in perspective in relation to Husserl’s genetic 
phenomenology, it is useful to heed what Husserl 
says on the static and the genetic phenomenology. 
In his introduction to phenomenology (1927) he 
has this to say:
The systematic construction of a phenome-
nological pure psychology demands:
(1) The description of the peculiarities uni-
versally belonging to the essence of intentional 
mental process, which includes the most 
general law of synthesis: every connection of 
consciousness with consciousness gives rise 
to a consciousness.
(2) The  exp lora t ion  o f  s ing le  for ms  o f 
intentional mental process which in essential 
necessity generally must or can present 
themselves in the mind; in unity with this, 
also the exploration of the syntheses they 
are members of for a typology of their 
essences: both those that are discrete and 
those continuous with others, both the finitely 
closed and those continuing into open infinity.
(3) The showing and eidetic description 
[Wesensdeskription] of the total structure 
[Gesamtgestalt] of mental life as such; in 
other words, a description of the essential 
character [Wesensart] of a universal “stream 
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of consciousness.”
(4) The term “I” designates a new direction 
for investigation (still in abstraction from the 
social sense of this word) in reference to the 
essence-forms of “habituality”; in other words, 
the “I” as subject of lasting beliefs or thought-
tendencies —“persuasions” —(convictions 
about being, value-convictions, volitional 
decisions, and so on), as the personal subject 
of habits, of trained knowing, of cer tain 
character qualities.
Throughout all this, the “static” description of 
essences ultimately leads to problems of genesis, 
and to an all-pervasive genesis that governs 
the whole life and development of the personal 
“I” according to eidetic laws [eidetischen 
Gesetzen]. So on top of the first “static phenom-
enology” will be constructed in higher levels 
a dynamic or genetic phenomenology. As the 
first and founding genesis it will deal with that 
of passivity—genesis in which the “I” does not 
actively par ticipate. Here lies the new task, 
an all-embracing eidetic phenomenology of 
association, a latter-day rehabilitation of David 
Hume’s great discovery, involving an account of 
the a priori genesis out of which a real spatial 
world constitutes itself for the mind in habitual 
acceptance. There follows from this the eidetic 
theory dealing with the development of personal 
habituality, in which the purely mental “I” within 
the invariant structural forms of consciousness 
exists as personal “I” and is conscious of itself 
[27] in habitual continuing being and as always 
being transformed. For further investigation, 
there offers itself an especially interconnected 
stratum at a higher level: the static and then the 
genetic phenomenology of reason. (Husserl, 
“Phenomenology,” Encyclopaedia Britannica 
1927, §1.5)
And, Bourdieu keeps the system of classificatory 
schemes separate from “a taxonomy based on 
explicit and explicitly concerted principles” or, 
more strongly, from any reflective mastery “that 
is required in order to construct a taxonomy 
that is simultaneously coherent and adequate to 
social reality,” or, even, from any act of cognition, 
emphasizing that “the practical ‘attributive 
judgement’ whereby one puts someone in a class 
by speaking to him in a cer tain way (thereby 
putting oneself in a class at the same time) has 
nothing to do with an intellectual operation” 
and that “whether it is used to situate oneself in 
social space or to place others, the sense of social 
space, like every practical sense, always refers to 
the particular situation in which it has to orient 
practices.” For Bourdieu, the practical logics and 
the image of classificatory schemes is inherently 
fuzzy and depends on people’s position in the 
social space, yet the social structure is inscribed 
into one’s taste like a ’memory jogger’ that finds its 
expression practically in all acts including speech 
and gestures within “the space and time one feels 
entitled to take from others” (D, pp. 472–475).
Then, Bourdieu argues that the interest in 
using classificatory schemes or making attributive 
judgments is inherently related to the advantage 
of doing so.  “Every real inquiry into the divisions 
of the social world has to analyze the interests 
associated with membership or non-membership” 
(Distinction, p. 476) Bourdieu says that it is 
the power over the classificatory schemes that 
brings out the dif ference and distinction out 
of undif ferentiated continuity.  But, because 
this power is socially conditioned by its limits, 
institutionalization of the system of classificatory 
schemes in the mind of individual agents requires 
that it be no longer perceived as limits if they 
themselves are to act as agents of production for 
the established order.  In this sense, classificatory 
systems become a principle of reproducing the 
dif ferences that make up the established order 
through the symbolic logic of dif ferentiation. 
Such systems, therefore, are a symbolic power 
that reproduces themselves as a symbolic logic 
of practice and distinction that is imposed on the 
mental structures of individual agents without a 
sense of being coerced by it.  And, finally, on the 
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reality of representation and the representation 
of reality, Bourdieu holds that social science does 
not have to choose between social semiology that 
aims at knowing the reality through the logics 
of classification and the idealist semiology that 
describes a social world as a product of mental 
(linguistic) structures, or between the objectivist 
and the subjectivist theories. What we need is the 
practical knowledge of divisions and classifications 
that social agents acquire by internalizing the 
external conditions of their distributions into their 
dispositions.  This brings us back to the thesis that 
the habitus, as the site of the dialectic between 
the opus operatum and the modus operandi of 
divisions and classifications, is what constructs the 
social world.   We end our inquiry into Bourdieu’s 
theory with the following quotation.
In shor t, social science does not have to 
choose between that form of social physics, 
represented by Durkheim—who agrees with 
social semiology in acknowledging that one 
can only know ’reality’ by applying logical 
instruments of classification —and the idealist 
semiology which, undertaking to construct ‘an 
account of accounts’, as Harold Garfinkel puts 
it, can do no more than record the recordings of 
a social world which is ultimately no more than 
the product of mental, i.e., linguistic, structures. 
What we have to do is to bring into the science 
of scarcity, and of competition for scarce goods, 
the practical knowledge which the agents obtain 
for themselves by producing—on the basis 
of their experience of the distributions, itself 
dependent on their position in the distributions 
—divisions and classifications which are no 
less objective than those of the balance-sheets 
of social physics. In other words, we have to 
move beyond the opposition between objectivist 
theories which identify the social classes (but 
also the sex or age classes) with discrete 
groups, simple countable populations separated 
by boundaries objectively drawn in reality, and 
subjectivist (or marginalist) theories which 
reduce the ‘social order’ to a sort of collective 
classification obtained by aggregating the 
individual classifications or, more precisely, the 
individual strategies, classified and classifying, 
through which agents class themselves and 
others. (D, p. 483)
8.    Veblen, Adam Smith, and Bourdieu from 
the Parsonian perspective
We started our inquiry into institutionalized values 
as the need-dispositions of socialized individuals 
by examining Parsons’ notion of social action and 
social system.  Apart from many of the criticisms 
some of which were discussed here, it does 
provide a useful theoretical framework in which 
to place the theories of Veblen, Adam Smith, 
and Broudieu in perspective.  Parsons views an 
individual actor as an integrated structure of 
motivational and cultural elements, and he views 
culture as a whole comprised of three systems—
belief systems, systems of expressive symbolism, 
and systems of evaluative standards, the last of 
which, constituting a system of values, becomes 
integrated into an action system and serves as 
selective criteria for screening actions.  In essence, 
cultural value patterns (common normative values) 
are internalized into the motivational structure of 
an individual actor along with positive sanctions for 
conformity and negative sanctions for deviation. 
This internalization is mediated by value-attitudes 
or sentiments which become the need-dispositions 
of the personality.  In this way, the ego-ideal (what 
one desires to accomplish) becomes integrated 
with the superego (the moral responsibilities), 
along with the sense of self-respect, adequacy, and 
security.  Thus, for Parsons, this integration of 
common value patterns with the need-dispositions 
of individuals through internalization constitutes a 
social system, and the stability of a social system 
depends crucially on the extent of this integration.  
If Veblen’s theory of the leisure class and the 
canon of pecuniary waste for invidious comparison 
is placed within the framework of Parsons’ theory 
of institutionalization of cultural values in the 
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motivational structure of individual actors, it is seen 
that what is achieved by internalization in Parsons’ 
theory is made possible by habituation in Veblen. 
The instinct of workmanship, through succeeding 
phases of cultural development, constantly 
motivates our desire for invidious comparison and 
self-respect, whether through demonstration of 
force in the primitive phase, or through acquisition 
by war and seizure in the predatory phase, or 
through accumulation of wealth in the quasi-
peaceable phase.  Through the evolution of the 
cultural expression of this instinct comes, in a 
subsequent phase, the life of leisure as the most 
definitive evidence of pecuniary achievement and 
reputability, with exemption from productive work 
taking over accumulation of wealth as a measure 
of social standing.  The institutionalization of 
the leisure class brings with it refined codes of 
decorum on all walks of life and other vicarious 
means for the demonstration of the life of leisure. 
The institution of conspicuous leisure also spawns 
the culture of valuing elaborate goods for invidious 
comparison and using such goods in consumption 
as a symbolic means of demonstrating pecuniary 
reputability.  In this way, conspicuous leisure 
and conspicuous consumption gain the status of 
social norms for members of the leisure class. 
The institutionalization of the leisure class also 
brings with it a hierarchical differentiation of social 
classes, where lower classes emulate the norms 
set by the leisure class at the top as an ideal. 
Moreover, the habits of thought fixed on the canon 
of conspicuous waste for invidious comparison 
traverse our sense of what is useful and beautiful, 
cultivating our sense of tastes for novelty through 
the blending of the beautiful and the honorific in 
the apperceptive activities of the mind.   Such tastes 
tend to admire those goods that combine beauty, 
skillful workmanship, and honorific reputability, 
thereby serving as a selective principle that helps 
screen goods according to such combined effects.  
In Veblen’s theory, the culture of conspicuous 
leisure and consumption emerges through a long 
process of habituation that draws from the instinct 
of workmanship.  This culture is then internalized 
into the motivational structure of individuals, 
forming a norm-oriented disposition that seeks 
emulation in the life process both as an ego-ideal 
and as a morally responsible act and which, in turn, 
is rewarded with social approval and self-respect. 
Our sense of novelty and our desire for goods that 
meet it motivate producers of such goods. To be 
innovative in creating ever more ingenious goods, 
thus, is an important part of the invidious culture, 
but the canon of tastes for invidious comparison 
and pecuniary waste does not provide a generative 
principle for future innovative activities; this canon, 
however strongly it may be ingrained in the mind 
of individuals, plays its role as a selective principle 
that guides individuals in screening goods for their 
effectiveness as a means of invidious comparison. 
In Veblen, it is the instinct of workmanship that 
is the fundamental generative principle, which, 
together with the culture of the leisure class and 
the canon of conspicuous waste that goes with 
it, keeps the cultural evolution going that always 
thrives on invidious comparison in one form or 
another.
Like Veblen’s,  Adam Smith’s theor y has 
two complementar y elements, an instinct for 
workmanship for better articles of conveniency 
on the one hand and our moral sentiments of 
approbation and disapprobation, which dispose 
men to desire such articles for the sake of getting 
applaud from other people on the other.  Such 
sentiments are habituated to admire the rich and 
despise the poor, and they underlie our never 
ceasing desire to emulate the rich by acquiring 
ever more refined articles of conveniency.  Because 
these sentiments are universal, superior stations of 
life set the standard to be imitated by men of lower 
stations of life. Custom and fashion of dif ferent 
ages and nations, by habituating the judgments 
of beauty (the apperceptive activity of beauty in 
Veblen), affect the moral sentiments of approbation 
and disapprobation, but their influences are 
limited to the propriety and impropriety of 
particular usages of such sentiments (particular 
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passions and particular rules of decorum), never 
to their general character.  Our moral character 
is compromised, but our moral sentiments of 
approbation and disapprobation never wane. In 
Parsons’ terms, the cultural (moral) values of 
emulating the rich and avoiding the poor are 
internalized into the motivational structure of 
the personality, and this internalized disposition 
shares the moral sentiments of approbation for 
the rich and of disapprobation toward the poor as 
well as moral sentiments for perpetual quest of 
wealth. It may be said that the moral approbation 
and disapprobation dimension of an individual 
coincides with the favorable-unfavorable or the 
gratification-depravation dimension.  For Adam 
Smith, this is all part of a deception that constantly 
renews the industr y of mankind.  It is par t of 
Providence: A society with such moral sentiments 
has a conjoined force of innovation and emulation 
that mediates economic growth and expansion 
of employment through class differentiation and 
division of labor.  Alternatively, in Adam Smith, an 
instinct of workmanship and the moral sentiments 
o f  approbat ion and disapprobat ion,  when 
conjoined, serve as a generative principle of not 
only the tastes for refined articles of conveniency 
and the invidious culture in general but also of an 
economic order that expands with spontaneous 
division of labor. In this sense, the theor y of 
Adam Smith is a theory of reinforcing dynamics 
of the instinct of workmanship and the moral 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. 
The crux of his theory is inherited by Veblen’s 
theory of the instinct of workmanship and the 
evolution of invidious culture, where the question 
of an economic order is set aside. In Parsons’ 
terms, common normative values of emulation 
for invidious comparison are integrated, through 
internalization, with the need-disposition structure 
of individuals, and this integration, mediated by 
the sentiments or value-attitudes that are learned 
and acquired socially, drives the evolution of the 
society in search for further novelty and ingenuity.
But, the moral sentiments are not enough 
for the way the economy works out its order. 
Such sentiments sit in a bigger picture of moral 
sentiments.  Man’s regard for the general rules 
of morality (man’s sense of duty) is a principle 
of the greatest consequence in human life, and 
the very existence and development of human 
society hinges on the tolerable obser vance of 
these rules.  Thus, the way the economy works 
out its order as an extended one is a product of the 
working of two principles, moral sentiments and 
moral sense. The first kindles man’s ambition for 
admiration by others and, therefore, keeps going 
all industry of mankind including workmanship, 
and the second supports man’s endeavors by the 
general rules of conduct that are shared by men 
of good faith.  But, this order is part of a deception 
that perpetuates economic growth; it is, still more, 
part of Providence as it results from what is innate 
in man.  A society of men endowed with moral 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation and 
moral faculties has a conjoined force of innovation 
(to produce refined articles of conveniency) and 
emulation (to grain in reputability) that mediates 
economic growth and employment through class 
differentiation and division of labor.  In this sense, 
Adam Smith’s evolutionar y theor y is a theor y 
of mutually reinforcing dynamic forces of moral 
sentiments and moral sense.  It has much to share 
with Veblen’s dynamic theory of the instinct of 
workmanship and conjoined tastes, but there is 
a fundamental dif ference.  Adam Smith star ts 
with the premise of cer tain sentiments from 
which man’s industry including workmanship is 
derived, whereas Veblen starts with the instinct 
of workmanship from which circumvented tastes 
are derived. In addition, Adam Smith puts moral 
faculties on an equal footing with moral sentiments, 
whereas Veblen sees the canon of moral conduct 
as traversed by the canon of honorific waste.  The 
two theories are, nonetheless, almost homologous.
In Parsons’ terms, whether in Adam Smith or in 
Veblen, the cultural (moral) values of emulating 
the rich and avoiding the poor are internalized into 
the motivational structure of the personality, and 
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this internalized disposition guides an evolution 
of a socio-economic and cultural order.  It may be 
said that the tastes for the honorific reputability 
form the basis of the favorable-unfavorable or 
the gratification-depravation dimension of an 
individual agent in a social system.  In Parsons’ 
terms, common normative values of emulation 
for invidious comparison are integrated, through 
inter nal izat ion,  with the need-disposi t ion 
structure of individuals, and this integration, 
mediated by the value-attitudes that are learned 
and acquired socially, drives the evolution of the 
society in search for ever more refined novelty 
and ingenuity.  While Parsons is concerned with 
the stability of a social system as affected by the 
degree of this integration, Adam Smith and Veblen 
point to the dynamic evolution of a social system 
perpetuated by the generative principles, whether 
of workmanship or of moral sentiments and moral 
sense.
Bourdieu shares much with Veblen and Adam 
Smith.  Bourdieu’s fundamental question focuses 
on how social space is constructed actively in the 
mind of individuals, with all its dif ferentiation, 
from other wise undif ferentiated continuity 
and uniformity, and he attempts to answer this 
question, not by an intellectual operation of a 
third person, but from within the space itself. 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is the self-fulfilling 
or self-generating principle, and is defined both 
as a structuring structure and as a structured 
structure.  It is the necessity of one’s position 
in the social space turned into a systematic and 
transportable disposition that generates practices 
and perceptions that are socially meaningful. The 
social space is then filled with life-styles as socially 
qualified sign systems based on a distribution 
of symbolic capital and power, all in the mind of 
the constituent individuals.  This habitus is then 
preserved by tastes, which are a coherent set of 
preferences in the logic of sign systems, or, more 
generally, an operator of mapping from the space 
of neutral objects or physical bodies into the space 
of symbolic distinctions.  It is such tastes that turn 
the forced choices or the necessity of one’s position 
in the social space into the virtue of making such 
choices.  In a social space mediated by these tastes, 
economic and cultural capital is appropriated to 
different degrees in different classes; such capital 
determines the distance and the proximity of 
life-styles; the rich and the dominant develops 
the tastes of luxury and freedom which traverse 
their aesthetic preferences for ease and facility, 
refined language, noble gestures, and quality, 
whereas the poor and the dominated develop 
the tastes of necessity which traverse their 
aesthetic preferences for self-imposed austerity, 
outspoken language, and fast gestures.  Thus, in 
Bourdieu’s theory, the principle of habitus, by 
its structuring structure mediated by tastes for 
symbolic expressions, reproduces the social space 
from within, by structuring the mind with the 
logic of socially meaningful symbolic distinctions. 
In Parsonian language, the habitus is the need-
disposition which internalizes normative values or 
a logic of sign systems appropriate to a social class 
that one belongs, which is sustained by turning 
the economic necessity into the virtue of making 
appropriate choices.  While Parsons identifies 
the institutionalization of common normative 
values as a necessary condition of a stable social 
system, Bourdieu identifies the habitus as the 
generative principle of this system, not as an 
objective operation, nor as a subjective one, but as 
a creative operation that turns the external into a 
durable and active disposition that generates and 
embodies a meaningful social space from within. 
Moreover, Bourdieu’s habitus is not limited to the 
construction of a social space in its role.  It is a 
creative operation by which the institution of the 
economy becomes fully viable, although the way 
the economy works out its order is not brought to 
light fully in his theory.  
In the language of Bourdieu’s theor y, the 
expression of Veblen’s instinct of workmanship (his 
primary generative principle) and the habituated 
tastes for invidious pecuniary comparison (his 
selective principle that has resulted from the 
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instinct of workmanship through a long history 
of habituation and evolution) can be thought 
of as being both a structuring structure (that 
carries within it the appropriate motivation and 
the symbolic products that meet the tastes for 
invidious comparison in pecuniary terms) and a 
structured structure with its logic of practice and 
distinction.  Likewise, Adam Smith’s notion of 
the tastes for the reputability based on the moral 
sentiments for approbation and disapprobation 
can be thought of as a structuring structure.  And, 
the symbolic space of those differentiated articles, 
both of ordinary usage and of those of elegant 
contrivances, that satisfy our quest for approbation, 
can be thought of as a structured structure that 
makes cultural consumption possible. Both 
structures share the same expressive logic. Adam 
Smith’s human folly of toiling for more wealth and 
better contrivances resonates with Bourdieu’s 
notion that the experiences in the social world 
belong to a misrecognized order of this world, not 
an intellectual operation.
Whether it is a human folly or a misrecognized 
order, a socio-economic and cultural order, (or 
a social space in general terms) is a product of 
an active construction in the human mind that 
validates the real world.  If so, any theory of human 
action must be grounded in this construction.  But, 
if human action so apprehended can be proved to 
be rational in the formal sense of making the most 
preferred choices for symbolic profits within the 
constraint of the external conditions, it should not 
be surprising. Such possibilities, as demonstrated 
in Hayakawa (1977, 2000), testify that the notion of 
rational goal-orientation retains its meaning even in 
the context of institutionalized systems and actions. 
But, one should not be content with the formality 
of the proof.  What is important is the generative 
principle that can account for the spontaneous 
evolution of a socio-economic and cultural order, 
which is made possible by apprehending activities 
of the mind.  In this sense, the institutional theories 
of Adam Smith, Veblen, and Bourdieu are the 
precursor to future phenomenological approaches 
to the evolving nature of such an order. 
While Parsons’ view of human action in a 
social system emphasizes the integration of 
cultural value patterns and the motivational 
structure of individual actors, a society would 
lose its cohesiveness unless the majority of its 
constituent personalities shared certain common 
value attitudes or sentiments.  Parsons says that 
the stability of any social system depends on 
the degree to which common normative values 
are integrated into the need-dispositions of its 
constituent personalities.  His dynamic theorem of 
sociology can provide a useful conceptual scheme 
by which to analyze the evolutionary theories of 
Veblen, Adam Smith, and Bourdieu, each of which 
gives a specific content to what is institutionalized 
in the motivational structure of individual person-
alities.
We now finish this paper with a hopeful note on 
constructing a socio-economic theory of decision 
making which is rooted in a middle ground 
between economics of the objective rationality on 
the one hand and sociology of institutionalized 
behavior on the other.
9.   In search for a middle ground between 
economics and sociology
If the preferences/need-dispositions of individuals 
are rooted in the institutionalized  motivational 
structure, the notion of utility function as a 
surrogate of the true objective function (which 
lies hidden, hence not observable) loses its usual 
power.  The reason is simple: When it comes to the 
social utility of any good, it is not possible to know 
a priori how useful it can be, unless one knows 
how meaningful it is to acquire it for the purpose 
of emulation or avoidance; that is, the social value 
of a good should consist in the symbolic profits 
that it yields, or in cultural consumption that it 
af fords.  This means that at least four elements 
are needed for social valuation of a good: (1) a 
social space or field which features life-styles of 
various social classes, (2) a measure of distance 
that separates social classes on the social status 
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ladder, (3) a reaction function or pattern, not in 
the game-theoretical sense of the best response 
function derived from some original utility or 
payoff function, but rather as a socially meaningful 
composite pattern based on economic, sociological, 
psychological, and communicational factors, 
and (4) a measure of the popularity of goods in 
various life-style which informs which goods can 
yield symbolic profits in terms of higher status 
identification.  If the social value of choice objects 
is determined through these elements, preferences 
can no longer be independent of the social space/
field in which individuals are located/situated and 
of the motivational structure in which common 
normative values are internalized.  In approaching 
the problem of decision making, economists 
usually start, with a good reason, with a utility 
function, whether this be defined on the space of 
choice objects or on the space of characteristics. 
In this conventional approach, the demand for any 
choice object reflects the nature of the constraints 
(the budget constraint or a production function 
that relates choice objects to final characteristics). 
In contrast, the institutional theories of Veblen, 
Adam Smith, Bourdieu, and Parsons suggest 
that the utility of a good arises more from an 
individual’s appreciation of its symbolic value, 
either in relation to the social space perceived 
in the mind of an individual or in relation to the 
socially acquired need disposition, than from its 
objective characteristics.  It is the symbolic power 
of a good that defines its social utility.
In one of my previous papers (Hayakawa, 2000), 
I related such social orientation in decision making 
to the economics of bounded rationality á la Simon 
(1955, 1959) and to the economics of limited 
cognition (e.g., Cyert and March, 1963; Conlisk, 
1988; Day and Pingle, 1991; Pingle, 1992; Pingle 
and Day, 1996), by drawing on the following points: 
(1) The decision-making environment including the 
internal psychology and the cognitive capacity of a 
decision maker may be significantly short of being 
perfect; (2) the time endowment is fixed so that 
all activities including cognition compete for the 
use of time; (3) information on which decisions are 
based is almost always insufficient but information 
gathering/processing entails a significant cost 
of time; (4) many situations in which decisions 
are made are imbued with risk and uncertainty. 
With these limitations, decision makers may turn, 
for their motivation, to the procedurally rational 
means of handling them in order to economize on 
the cost of problem solving.  That is, they turn to 
simple modes of behavior which have been proven 
ef fective over years through an error-learning 
process.  This is, in essence, the point made by 
Simon (1978) when he brought forth the notion 
of the procedural rationality as opposed to the 
substantive rationality.
If the decision making environment is char-
acterized by these limiting conditions, and if 
humans are predisposed to act in accordance 
with common normative values, it is rational for 
individual actors to economize on the modes 
of behavior, by adapting to socially meaningful 
heuristics that can be found in social/cultural 
capital, without losing sight of competition for 
symbolic profits.  Hodgson (1986) argues that in 
understanding human behavior it is not necessary 
to fall into the trap of complete voluntaristic 
individualism nor into the trap of the structural 
determinism.  Bounded rationality that draws on 
social capital of heuristics allows human behavior 
to be molded by social and cultural norms while 
retaining the autonomy of individual decision 
makers.
In this connection, it is useful to recall that 
Day (1984, 1987) listed seven basic modes of eco-
nomizing choices: (1) obedience to an authority, (2) 
imitation of others’ modes, (3) habit (unconscious 
repetition of past behavior), (4) unmotivated 
search, (5) hunch, (6) experimentation (trial 
and error), and (7) procedural optimizing (see 
Pingle and Day, 1996).  Some of these modes may 
draw on social and cultural norms, not only as a 
source of low-cost heuristics but also as a source 
of socially acceptable forms by which to endow 
human action with social meaning.  In a similar 
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vein, Beckert (1996) argued that if the means-
end relations on which economic calculations 
are based are lacking because of uncer tainty, 
some external mechanisms are needed to reduce 
the choice set of decision makers and to restore 
certainty in the means-end relations. Since, as 
Knight (1921) argued, uncertainty is not reducible 
to calculable probabilities, the means-end relations 
break down when the condition of uncertainty 
prevails, and with this difficulty falls the power of 
the conventional rational choice theory. Hence, 
the condition of uncertainty necessitates that this 
theory be replaced by a more practical one that 
can somehow restore the means-end relations by 
limiting the set of choice objects.  As an alternative 
to the objective rationality, Beckert introduced 
the notion of intentional rationality, which relies 
on simple devices as instruments of uncertainty 
reduction.  Such devices include (1) tradition, 
habit, and routines, (2) norms and institutions, 
(3) structural pre-dispositions of decisions such 
as social networks, organizational structures, and 
past decisions, and (4) power relations (Beckert, 
1996; pp. 827−829).  Beckert argues that making 
use of these devices narrows the choice set of 
decision makers and make actions adaptive and 
hence predictable, by building up rigidities in 
human behavior.  This argument shares much with 
Heiner’s insight (1983, 1989) that the boundedness 
of the decision-making environment is an important 
source of predictable behavior as decision 
makers turn to more inflexible decision rules.  It 
is similar to Simon’s argument that the intended 
and bounded rationality (that takes the form of 
satisficing behavior) forms the theoretical basis 
of administrative behavior (Simon, 1976).  In this 
regard it is useful to recall that Hayek (1967) made 
a similar point that while our conscious activities 
are subject to supra-conscious rules (which are 
intuited but whose content cannot be made clear), 
we resort to such rules as customs, habits, and 
moral rules in order to narrow the range of choice 
alternatives so that our actions are made more 
meaningful.  All this line of reasoning was pursued 
in various forms in the 84th Dahlem Workshop 
on Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, 
Berlin, 1999 (see, e.g, the papers by  Gigerenzer 
and Selton, 2001;  Selton, 2001;  Gigerenzer, 2001; 
Boyd and Richerson, 2001; Goldstein, Rappporteur, 
2001).
However one may argue for the case of bounded 
rationality, the recognition that human behavior is 
boundedly rational and that this limited rationality 
calls for devices that reduce the complexity of 
the problem solving situations may support the 
institutional approaches of Veblen, Adam Smith, 
Bourdieu, and Parsons, the reason being that 
behaving in accordance with institutionalized 
norms is a mode of behavior that is not only 
simplifying but also socially meaningful and 
acceptable.  In my paper (2000), I considered 
the following points par ticularly impor tant in 
constructing a model of norm-guided behavior or 
norm-guided endogenous preference formation: 
(1) The society takes on a bigger meaning than a 
mere aggregation of its parts, since it holds itself 
as an order by a principle of internal connection 
and integration that is higher than a principle 
that applies to its parts.  (2) What the society has 
accumulated as social and cultural capital over 
years can ser ve as reliable sources of socially 
meaningful (i .e. ,  symbolically meaningful) 
simplification devices to other wise complex 
decision problems.  (3) Decision makers will 
turn to simple modes of behavior or heuristic 
solutions in order to economize on cognitive 
effort otherwise required to deal with the limiting 
conditions of the decision-making environment. 
(4) If preferences are composed of various needs 
that are not necessarily commensurate, these 
needs may have to be prioritized and satisfied 
sequentially with switching from one need 
to the next being ef fectuated as soon as the 
aspiration level is reached.  (5) There are social 
and cultural norms (social institutions, customs, 
sanctions, cultural values, etc.), which would not 
be reproduced and sustained unless such norms 
motivate individuals to endow their actions with 
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social meaning supportive of the norms. If the 
needs beyond physical ones are social needs that 
arise from social norms, such norms may account 
for the origin of norm-guided preferences for social 
interdependence.  (5) More strongly, the formation 
of norm-guided preferences or the recognition of 
social needs reflects the desire to act in a socially 
meaningful way when there are serious limits 
to the objective rationality.  Social and cultural 
norms are, therefore, not simply the sources of 
external influences on human behavior, but rather 
they endow the decision-making environment 
with a social and cultural structure under which 
norm-oriented preferences are actively formed to 
reproduce the structure itself.  (6) Under a socially 
structured environment, individuals are likely 
to exercise local rationality within their zones of 
flexible responses (in Day’s terms (1984, 1986)), 
which are determined by the history of their past 
emulation and avoidance.
Based on these considerations, I proposed a 
theory of choice behavior that answers Simon’s call 
for procedural rationality as well as Hodgson’s call 
for norm-oriented purposive behavior, by positing 
that low-cost heuristics to other wise complex 
choice problems can be found in the life-styles of 
social groups.  These life styles constitute a form of 
social capital that has been accumulated through 
some collective learning processes.  The idea is 
that if the cost of problem solving is too excessive 
for single individuals to bear, it makes sense to 
invest in this capital collectively by sharing the cost 
of the required investment, since the benefits of 
the accumulated consumption know-how accrue to 
all members of social groups.  If one relies on this 
capital in the choice of consumption goods, the task 
of selecting the best object from the set of feasible 
alternatives is reduced to the act of referring to 
what has been tested and approved collectively. 
The life styles of social groups are embedded in a 
cultural-value system so that the act of orienting to 
them is in accord with the need-dispositions that 
are acquired socially; hence individuals in a social 
system are aware of appropriate actions to take for 
status seeking under social sanctions (Granovetter, 
1985).  In this sense, the society is not simply a 
collection of life-styles or clusters of wants, but 
is a culturally directed social field (analogous to a 
magnetic field in physics) in which the life styles of 
social groups exist as norms of consumption and 
in which individuals are informed of the direction 
for higher status identification when acting within 
their zones of flexible responses.  It is this social 
field that gives rise to social want as a culturally 
directed social predisposition.
If we are to build a theory of choice based on 
this social want, we need to measure the degree 
to which this want is satisfied by choice objects, 
and then use this measurement to rank such 
objects.  Since there is no a priori utility function, 
this measure has to be constructed from the 
social field.  If we locate the life-styles of various 
social groups on the social status scale and 
define an emulation-avoidance pattern on this 
scale through constructing a composite function 
based on economic, sociological, psychological, 
communicational, and other factors, similar to 
the one constructed by Ray (1973), the degree to 
which any commodity can satisfy the social want 
can be approximated by the convolution of this 
emulation-avoidance pattern with the distribution 
of its popularity index over the life-styles of the 
social groups. Such measurement is grounded 
in a social field in which social distance and the 
direction of social status emulation are defined. 
We may call such measurement (of social want 
satisfying property) the convoluted social value 
of a commodity.  If members of society evaluate 
the social value of a commodity in this fashion, 
the rationality of basing one’s choice decisions on 
this convoluted measurement becomes another 
important source of social evolution driven by the 
motives for emulation and avoidance.18）
In Figure 1 are shown two emulation-avoidance 
patterns, 1 and 2.  Pattern 1 has a shape typical of 
individuals whose need-dispositions are formed 
under invidious culture as in Veblen’s theory of the 
leisure class and Adam Smith’s theory of moral 
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sentiments.  It is skewed toward higher statuses. 
On the other hand, pattern 2 has a shape typical of 
individuals whose dispositions are inclined to value 
the life-styles that are being lived now; it captures 
roughly what Bourdieu expounded when he says 
that economic necessities are turned into virtues 
(liking what one has).
Suppose we summarize an emulation-avoidance 
pattern by a normalized effort index on the domain 
between zero and one.  With such normalization, 
it may be said that the more skewed this pattern 
is toward higher social statuses, the more effort is 
exerted by a typical individual for a higher status 
identification, which, therefore, can be represented 
by a greater index number.  Once an emulation-
avoidance pattern is translated into an ef for t 
index, all individuals in the society as a group can 
be represented by the set of their effort indices. 
Since the shape of an emulation/avoidance pattern 
of a given individual should be affected by those of 
other individuals, the effort index of an individual 
should depend on those of other individuals.  If 
the first is viewed as the effective response to the 
second, then we may characterize the society-
wide state of emulation/avoidance in terms of a 
Nash equilibrium of all individuals’ effort levels. 
Since such levels are defined on the domain of 
[0, 1], we may treat all individuals symmetrically 
as far as their effort intensity is concerned.  Such 
treatment allows the society-wide emulation/
avoidance to be represented by a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. Then, depending on the nature of an 
individual’s response to the rest of society, various 
equilibrium possibilities arise. Moreover, if a 
typical individual’s effort index rises in response to 
a symmetric increase in the effort indices of other 
individuals, there arise strategic complementarities 
among the ef fort indices of all individuals, and 
such strategic complementarities give rise to the 
multiplier process and the multiplier effect. These 
possibilities fall within the general framework 
analyzed by Cooper and John (1988), in which the 
optimal response functions of symmetric agents 
are derived from their payoff functions that are 
given a priori.  One could think of our response 
patterns/functions as the ef fective response func-
tions as opposed to the notional ones (derived from 
given payof f functions).  Such functions are a 
composite of various relations based on economic, 
sociological, psychological, and communicational 
factors (Ray, 1973).  They are analogous to Keynes’ 
notion of ef fective demand (as opposed to the 
notional one), which says that demand cannot be 
implemented without the purchasing power, either 
income with which to purchase consumption goods 
or funds with which to purchase durable goods 
for investment purposes.  The effective response 
functions  here are effective in the sense that they 
are feasible response patterns under all relevant 
constraints. 
Figure 2 shows four possible response functions 
of a typical individual.  If the effective response 
function coincides with the 45° line as in the case of 
pattern 1, any point on this line gives a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium.  If it takes the shape of pattern 2, 
every symmetric increase in the effort indices of all 
other individuals raises the effort index of a typical 
individual.  Hence, in this case, there are two 
symmetric Nash equilibria, one at (0, 0) and the 
other at (1, 1); the first is unstable since any small 
change in other individuals’ effort indices leads to 
an ever higher effort index of a typical individual 
until it converges to equilibrium (1, 1).  Point (1, 
1), on the other hand, is a stable symmetric Nash 
equilibrium.  If the effective response function is 
shaped after pattern 3, there is only one stable 
the emulation-avoidance
function 2
the social status ladder
lower status
O （＋）（－）
Figure 1:  the emulation-avoidance function
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symmetric Nash equilibrium, at point A.  To give 
another example, if a typical individual responds to 
other individuals positively but by taking an effort 
index that is lower than those of others, there will 
be two symmetric Nash equilibria, one at (0, 0) and 
the other at (1, 1), as in the case of pattern 1.  But, 
this time, point (0, 0) is a stable symmetric Nash 
equilibrium while point (1, 1) is an unstable one. 
If the response function coincides with the 45° 
line, there arises a continuum of symmetric Nash 
equilibria.  These possibilities reflect the degree to 
which the cultural values of emulation/avoidance 
are internalized in the motivational structure 
of individuals.  In a society which is strongly 
motivated to emulate higher statuses and avoid 
lower ones, a typical individual’ response function 
takes a high position in comparison with societies 
that are less motivated to do so or in which 
emulation is negatively sanctioned.  In terms of the 
effort indices of all individuals, such a society will 
attain a symmetric equilibrium further out on the 
45° line in comparison with other societies.
Another important point to be noted here is 
the multiplier process.  Take the case of the 
response function 3, which gives a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium at point A.  If this function shifts 
upward on a permanent basis for some reason, a 
rise in a typical individual’s effort  index caused 
by this shift causes a multiplier process which 
converges to point B.  The equilibrium change 
from point A to point B is greater than the initial 
shift for any individual, and, if so, the combined 
total of the equilibrium changes from point A to 
point B across all individuals is a fortiori greater 
than the equilibrium change of a typical individual. 
Notice that if the response function coincides with 
the 45° line, any small upward shift of this function 
takes the effort levels of all individuals eventually 
to (1, 1), and any small downward shift takes such 
levels to (0, 0).
This  d iscuss ion  on  nor m-guided soc ia l 
orientation and emulation-avoidance patterns 
suggests that there is still an ample ground for 
meaningful research on the institutional nature 
of decision making as well as on the evolutionary 
nature of society, based on the common normative 
values of emulation and avoidance for invidious 
purposes.  Such an agenda resonates with 
Hodgson’s recapitulation, of reconstitutive effects 
of institutions on the preferences of individuals, of 
the habit formation through institutional channels 
and constraints as the key to the mechanism of 
such reconstitution, and of the degree on which 
institutional evolution may depends on this habit 
formation (Hodgson, 2004).  It also shares the 
stand that Gintis (2009) takes, namely, that humans 
have a normative predisposition that allows 
common beliefs and social norms to choreograph 
a correlated equilibrium, which points to a new 
direction in research on how the bounds of reason 
and forms of sociality are integrated by a higher 
principle that correlates conflicting interests of 
social actors.  It may be regarded as an outgrowth 
of Parsons’s institutionalization theor y, which 
says that social systems are constituted of the 
need-dispositions acquired by individual actors by 
internalizing common normative values into their 
motivational structure.  This theory, in my view, 
can gain in power if social ontology (downward 
causation) is integrated with economic ontology 
(upward causation).
（0，1） （1，1）
（1，0）（0，0）
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the response
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Figure 2:  the optimal response function
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Notes
1） This paper was presented at The Multidisciplinary 
Decision Science Symposium held in Singapore 
in August 2010. The Symposium was organized 
by Nanyang Technological University (Center for 
Liberal Ar ts and Social Sciences and School of 
Humanities and Social Sciences).  The author would 
like to take this opportunity to thank the organizing 
and program committees of the Symposium for 
giving me an oppor tunity to take par t in this 
productive conference as Invited Speaker. The 
author thanks the participants of the Symposium 
for many productive comments, in par ticular, 
Dr. Shuntian Yao for his sug-gestion on how my 
approach can be connected to the evolutionar y 
game theory of norm formation, Dr. Euston Quah 
for his suggestion on how the knowledge of law 
helps the endogenous formation of social norms and 
preferences, Dr, Kwok Kian Woon for his suggestion 
on the need to delve further into the difference in 
the notion of rationality that lies between economics 
and sociology, Dr. Kim Kaivanto for his comment 
on  the connection between my research and 
epistemological game theory involving knowledge 
of social norms, and Dr. Basant Kapur, who kindly 
chaired my session with his sexcellent command and 
gave an insightful comment on the importance of 
acting on moral principles that are not compromised 
by social norms in breaking the status-quo of our 
society for the betterment of humanity.
2） Stigler and Becker, in their paper, “De Gustibus 
Non Est Disputandum” (1977), demonstrated that 
many of such phenomena that are thought to be 
inconsistent with the assumption of stable and 
similar tastes across dif ferent households can be 
analyzed without abandoning this assumption if 
the constraint functions are expanded beyond the 
usual budget constraint. They did so by viewing 
the household as engaged in extensive production/
investment activities that transform goods purchased 
in the market into the commodity objects that yield 
utility, with the help of, among others, time and 
human capital inputs of all individuals involved.  The 
relationship that holds between the commodity 
objects and the utility therefrom is assumed stable 
and identical across different households, whereas 
these transformation functions are treated as the 
(objective) production functions whose form is fixed 
but the exact position of which depends on time and 
human capital inputs of the individuals involved.  It 
is a distinct feature of their theory that the external 
influences from other individuals are not included in 
the utility function defined on the commodity space; 
they are instead incorporated into the production 
functions by way of the time and human capital 
inputs that they render.  By applying this formulation 
to such phenomena as addiction, custom and 
tradition (habitual behavior), advertising (imperfect 
information), and fashions (or distinction seeking), 
they show that these phenomena can be explained 
without modifying the assumption of  stable 
preferences, provided consumption activities  can be 
combined with production/investment activities.
 This is certainly an insight with many appli-cations. 
What Stigler and Becker are sug-gesting in their 
reformulation is that for each class of economic 
phenomena, there may be a corresponding class 
of models that, if specified correctly, can account 
for the phenomena in question without altering 
the basic assumption that preferences are stable 
and similar among people.  Such classes of models 
will take various forms depending on the nature 
of phenomena to be analyzed, but they share a 
similar structure spelled out in their new theory. 
The traditional consumer theory, which directly 
tie the market goods consumed to the utility that 
they yield, is a special case of their theor y, in 
which the production functions are reduced to 
trivial transformations of one-to-one from goods to 
commodities without the mediation of investment 
activities. To the extent such a generalized consumer 
theor y can reconcile, within the assumption of 
stable tastes, a wide range of phenomena that, 
on the surface, appear to be explainable only by 
allowing tastes to change, it is a welcome insight 
that buttresses the mainstream economist’ view that 
it is the prices of goods and income after all that 
matter ultimately in explaining consumer behavior. 
As shown by Stigler and Becker, what is needed to 
gain this added power of the conventional consumer 
choice theor y is to view each household as a 
consumer-factory and to allow it to make production 
choices aimed at producing its direct objects of 
consumption.
 Their new theory is expressed in the following 
framework: A household is assumed to maximize the 
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utility function of the form
 (1)   u = U(Z1, ..., Zm)
 subject to the production functions
 (2)  Zi = fi(X1i, ..., Xki; t1i, ..., tli, S1, ..., Sl, Yi),
       i = 1,..., m,
 where Zis are the commodity objects of choice 
entering the utility function (there are m such 
commodities); fi is the production function for the 
ith commodity; Xji is the quantity of the j-th market 
good or service used in the production of the ith 
commodity (there are k such goods and services in 
total); tji is the j-th person’s own time input; there 
are l such inputs as l individuals are involved in the 
production functions; Sj is j-th person’s human capital 
(there are l such inputs); and Yi represents all other 
inputs.
3） On the question of the position of sociology in 
relation to other social sciences, namely, economics 
and political science, Parsons holds a view that as 
the social system of action increases its degree of 
complexity, there emerge new properties that cannot 
be adequately dealt with in an analytical scheme 
applicable to a less complex system of action. 
According to Parsons, the first emergent property 
of action systems is that of economic rationality of 
individual actions that has given rise to an integrated 
economic theory.  The second emergent property 
comes from inclusion of a plurality of individuals, 
from which arises a new problem of coercion, (an 
exercise of power over others), and, consequently, 
the problem of a distributive order of power; these 
’political action elements’ are analyzed in the field 
of political science.  The third emergent property is 
that of social integration of individuals by way of a 
common value system; it is this property that defines 
the field of the science of sociology [Parsons (1949), 
vol. 2, pp. 765–769].  He states:
. . . the solution of the power question, as well as 
of a plurality of other complex features of social 
actions systems, involves a common reference to 
the fact of integration of individuals with reference 
to a common value system, manifested in the 
legitimacy of institutional norms, in the common 
ultimate ends of action, in ritual and in various 
modes of expression.  All these phenomena may 
be referred back to a single general emergent 
proper ty of social action systems which may 
be called “common-value integration.”  This is 
a clearly marked emergent proper ty readily 
distinguishable from both the economic and 
the political.  If this property is designated the 
sociological, sociology may be defined as “the 
science which attempts to develop an analytical 
theory of social action systems in so far as these 
systems can be understood in terms of the 
property of common value integration.” [Parsons 
(1949), p. 768] 
4） If, furthermore, the objects of the utility function 
is extended to other entities, animate or inanimate, 
and even to the entire universe, then this function 
carries the information as to how one assesses 
one’s activities in relation to other entities and the 
universe itself.  If the human being is a universe 
on its own, it is not surprising that the utility 
function, metaphysically, is a representation of 
this universal nature.  There is, however, one 
serious problem with the postulation of the utility 
function; once it is expressed, it makes all of its 
arguments commensurate in terms of their utility 
values.  Often, it is pointed out that moral values 
do not belong to the pleasure principle, therefore, 
are not commesurable with the usual objects of 
utility that satisfy our mundane needs; but it is 
worth contemplating on the real meaning of the 
commensurability principle rather than throwing 
it away on the ground that certain goods are not 
simply commensurate.  If the pleasure principle and 
the reality principle are both products of a human 
psyche, the commensurability principle can be 
viewed as mediating the two; it allows human beings 
to assess all of their activities without causing a 
schizophrenia in their personality.  This point will be 
discussed in a separate paper in which a model of 
norm-guided preference formation is presented.
  It is useful to recall in this connection that Etzioni 
(1986) argued that the concept of the monoutility 
is inadequate to capture the deontological aspect 
of human behavior, hence calling for the concept 
of multiple utility, basically one for pleasure and 
the other for moral values, and, later, for a new 
deontological I&We paradigm that casts individuals 
into social structures [Etzioni (1988)].  He criticized 
the traditional utility theory and its variants (namely, 
the pleasure utility theory based on utilitarianism, 
the interdependent utility theor y that extends 
the objects of utility to the satisfactions of other 
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individuals, and the grand X utility theor y that 
emphasizes the formality of a ranking of all choice 
objects through a common denominator called 
a grand X), and suggested that we should pay 
attention to the moral dimension of valuation, i.e., 
the moral utility arising from moral commitments 
and obligations as a distinct and non-reducible 
entity that affects human behavior in ways distinctly 
dif ferent from the way the pleasure-seeking does 
[Etzioni (1986)].  Etzioni’s call for multiple utility has 
motivated a new movement of metaeconomics that 
is based on the premise that a proper balance (or 
a healthy tension) between hedonistic self-interest 
and other-interest benefits both the individual and 
the society to which she belongs.  See Lynne (2000a, 
2000b, 2002) and the Metaeconomic Homepage 
(posted at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 
USA) for an overview of this approach. See also 
Hayakawa and Venieris (1977) for a critique of 
interdependence via individuals, in which many of 
the past efforts along this line are cited, and for an 
alternative approach to interdependence, namely, 
interdependence via reference groups.
5） Adam Smith is well known for this statement in 
The Wealth of Nations:
. . . It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect out 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. 
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but 
to their self-love, and never talk to them of our 
own necessities but of their advantages.  Nobody 
but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the 
benevolence of his fellow-citizens.  . . .  (p. 14)
 But,  to Adam Smith, the self - interest is not 
antithetical to our moral sense of propriety and 
impropriety of our conduct: he says in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments that “the sense of propriety, 
too, is here well suppor ted by the strongest 
motives of self-interest” (p. 241), and that “upon 
the tolerable observance of these duties depends 
the very existence of human society, which would 
crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally 
impressed with a reverence for those important 
rules of conduct” (pp. 241–32). 
6） See Manual Furer (1972) for the history of the 
concept of superego in psychoanalysis.
7） Parsons (1952) writes:
It would seem that only when a suf ficiently 
developed cognitive reference system and a 
system of expressive symbolism have been 
inter nalized is the foundation laid for the 
development of a superego; for only then can the 
child be said to be capable of understanding, in 
both the cognitive and the emotional senses, the 
meaning of the prescriptions and prohibitions 
which are laid upon him.  The child must 
mature to the point where he can begin to play a 
responsible role in a system of social interaction, 
where he can understand that what people feel is a 
function of his and their conformity with mutually 
held standards of conduct.  Only when he has 
become dependent on his mother’s love, can he 
develop meaningful anxiety in that then e might 
jeopardize his security in that love by not living 
up to her expectations of being a good boy.  (pp. 
27–28)
. . . If this analysis is correct, the cr ucial 
problem concerns the process of internalization 
of the common culture, including all three of 
its major components–the cognitive reference 
system, the system of expressive symbolism, and 
the system of moral standards.  (p. 28)
The conditions of socialization of a person are 
such that the gratifications which derive from 
his cathexis of objects cannot be secured unless, 
along with generalization of emotional meanings 
and their communications, he also develops a 
cognitive categorization of objects, including 
himself, and a system of moral norms which 
regulate the relations between himself and the 
object (a superego).  (p. 29)
If the foregoing account of the internalized 
content of personality and of the processes of 
identification points in the right direction, it 
would seem to imply the necessity for certain 
modifications of Freud’s structural theor y of 
personality.  The first point is that it is not only 
the superego which is internalized—that is, 
taken over by identification from cathected 
social objects—but that there are involved other 
important components which presumably must 
be included in the ego—namely, the system of 
cognitive categorizations of the world and the 
system of expressive symbolism.  (p. 30)
8） Kaye cites the following from Marcuse (1955, 
p. 8): 
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repression [i.e., “domination” and “suppression”] 
from without has been supported by repression 
from within: the unfree individual introjects his 
masters and their commands into his own 
mental apparatus.  The struggle against freedom 
reproduces itself in the psyche of man. (FC, p. 95) 
9） Veblen cautions:
In making use of the term “invidious,” it may 
perhaps be unnecessary to remark, there is no 
intention to extol or depreciate, or to commend 
or deplore any of the phenomena which the word 
is used to characterize.  The term is used in a 
technical sense as describing a comparison of 
persons with a view to rating and grading them in 
respect of relative worth or value–in an aesthetic 
or moral sense–and so awarding and defining the 
relative degrees of complacency with which they 
may legitimately be contemplated by themselves 
and by others.  An invidious comparison is a 
process of valuation of persons in respect of worth. 
(TLC, p. 40)
10） On the use of the term leisure, Veblen is explicit: It 
has already been remarked that the term ‘leisure,’ 
as here used, does not connote indolence or 
quiescence. What it connotes is non-productive 
consumption of time. Time is consumed non-
productively (1) from a sense of the unworthiness of 
productive work, and (2) as an evidence of pecuniary 
ability to afford a life of idleness.  . . .  (TLC, p. 46)
11） On the setting of the norm of reputability by the 
leisure class at the top of the social status, Veblen 
states:  
. . . The leisure class stands at the head of the 
social structure in point of reputability; and its 
manner of life and its standards of worth therefore 
afford the norm of reputability for the community. 
The obser vance of these standards, in some 
degree of approximation, becomes incumbent 
upon all classes lower in the scale. In modern 
civilized communities the lines of demarcation 
between social classes have grown vague and 
transient, and wherever this happens the norm of 
reputability imposed by the upper class extends its 
coercive influence with but slight hindrance down 
through the social structure to the lowest strata. 
The result is that the members of each stratum 
accept as their ideal of decency the scheme of life 
in vogue in the next higher stratum, and bend 
their energies to live up to that ideal.  On pain of 
forfeiting their good name and their self-respect in 
case of failure, they must conform to the accepted 
code, at least in appearance.  (TLC, p. 70)
12） On the use of the term “waste”, Veblen pro-vides 
the following account:
The use of the term “waste” is in one respect an 
unfortunate one. . . . It is here called “waste” 
because this expenditure does not serve human 
life or human well-being on the whole, not because 
it is waste or misdirection of effort or expenditure 
as viewed from the standpoint of the individual 
consumer who chooses it.  If he chooses it, 
that disposes of the question of its relative 
utility to him, as compared with other forms of 
consumption that would not be deprecated on 
account of their wastefulness. Whatever form of 
expenditure the consumer chooses, or whatever 
end he seeks in making his choice, has utility to 
him by virtue of his preference.  As seen from 
the point of view of the individual consumer, the 
question of wastefulness does not arise within 
the scope of economic theory proper.  The use of 
the word “waste” as a technical term, therefore, 
implies no deprecation of the motives or of the 
ends sought by the consumer under this canon of 
conspicuous waste.
But it is, on other grounds, worth noting that 
the term “waste” in the language of ever yday 
life implies deprecation of what is characterized 
as wasteful. This common-sense implication 
is itself an outcropping of the instinct of work-
manship.  . . . (TLC, p. 78)                                                            
13） Goods with both features of the beautiful and the 
honorific include, in addition to dress and household 
furniture, houses, household appliances, cars, 
jewelry, wine, dinner, services, et cetra. 
14） Veblen writes:
. . . If abstraction is made from association, 
suggest ion,  and “expression,”  c lassed as 
elements of beauty, then beauty in any perceived 
object means that the mind readily unfolds its 
apperceptive activity in the directions which the 
object in question af fords.  But the directions 
in which activity readily unfolds or expresses 
itself are the directions to which long and close 
habituation has made the mind prone.  So far as 
concerns the essential elements of beauty, this 
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habituation is an habituation so close and long 
as to have induced not only a proclivity to the 
apperceptive form in question, but an adaptation 
of physiological structure and function as well.  . . . 
(TLC, p. 109)
15） Thus, in Veblen’s view, goods provide two 
kinds of ser viceability, economic ser viceability 
(to meet the material/physiological ends) and 
social serviceability (to meet the desire to emulate 
consumption of higher status groups). The latter 
depends on the current status of the consumer 
as well as on the scope of honorific consumption 
objectively recognized. How to quantify the social 
serviceability contained in goods is thus critical to 
a model of social status emulation.  In a separate 
paper we explore the possibility of this quantification 
through the convolution of social facts and the 
emulation-avoidance pattern.
16） The canon of conspicuous waste as a selective 
principle, not a generative principle, marks a 
difference between Veblen’s theory of habituation of 
the canon of honorific consumption and Bourdeau’s 
theory of habitus as a generative principle [Bourdieu 
(1984)].  From the standpoint of the formation of 
norm-guided preferences, Veblen’s habituation 
of tastes through the apperceptive activity of 
man’s mind can be thought of as generating the 
preferences for honorific consumption, which, in 
turn, act as a selective principle in choosing goods 
of skillful workmanship and ingenuity. But, Veblen’s 
fundamental generative principle is his instinct 
of workmanship, namely, man’s sense of merit of 
productive work and of demerit of futile effort, from 
which the canon of conspicuous waste comes about 
through a long history of habituation. 
17） This remind us of the point that Veblen makes 
regarding the inseparability of the ef fectiveness 
of goods as a means of invidious comparison and 
the social context in which men exercise their 
choice decisions.  How a good is valued as a means 
of invidious comparison crucially depends on the 
social facts as to how fashionable it is in the high 
social class and how vogue it is in the lower social 
class, since emulation and avoidance is a matter 
of successful identification with social classes to 
be emulated.  In our model of social preference 
formation, we will consider this point in terms of 
the popularity of goods within social groups placed 
across the social status ladder. 
18） Cowan, Cowan, and Swann (2004) modeled 
consumption along a similar idea of emulation and 
avoidance via three reference groups: a peer group 
of similar consumers, a distinction group, and an 
aspiration group, and demonstrated that waves of 
consumption can be created through the interplay 
of aspiration and distinction based on emulation of 
the avant-garde consumption of up-market pioneers 
by others and how consumption activity started up-
market may spread to the social spectrum.  This 
model also shares the idea of consumption via 
reference groups expounded by Hayakawa and 
Venieris (1977).
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